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ABSTRACT
Innovations are part of everyday reality in the business life of many companies. While for
startups, success in business largely depends on success of innovations as they are trying to
enter the market, for large monopolistic companies the influx of innovations is a crucial part of
strategic decision-making. In a fast clockspeed high technology market, innovations are being
introduced every day and have to be evaluated to identify potential threat to existing
technology and market share of an incumbent. It is extremely difficult to understand if this new
technology is something relevant to the market and will be adopted fast by customers, or it is
merely one of many attempts, that will prove unsuccessful.
Overarching questions for this work is "Why does the same technology become dominant in
some cases while failing in others?"
This work focuses on considering several real life examples with different outcomes through
the lens of the Incumbent's Dilemma framework. The goal is to identify patterns of dynamics
for several typical innovation scenarios and provide explanations that might be useful for
product managers as well as top management of any company who want to understand how to
use innovations to improve business performance and gain market share.
Thesis Supervisor: Charles H. Fine
Title: Chrysler Leaders for Global Operations Professor of Management, Professor of Operations
Management and Engineering Systems, Co-director, International Motor Vehicle Program
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INTRODUCTION
Why do some new technologies become dominant while others fail or coexist with the old?
Numerous studies of technological innovations and organizational behavior have been asking
questions how and why incumbent corporations lose market share when new entrants attack
with "disruptive" innovations. While these studies certainly provide rich perspective on
disruptive innovations, there is no comprehensive framework exploring all the possible
outcomes. In some instances, large companies fail to adopt new technologies and lose market
share. However, this is not a definitive outcome. For any given clash, there are three distinct
outcomes possible: new entrant wins and incumbent loses its market, new entrant loses and
incumbent retains the market, or both new entrant and incumbent share the market. The
outcomes are agnostic to the type of environment (be it high tech or not) and can occur in
virtually every market as the underlying dynamics of drivers are the same. It is the combination
of firms' ability to understand their product, company and market requirements (i.e. user
needs) and to make right strategic decisions, that defines which outcome becomes more likely
and why. In this work, we will identify specific patterns of dynamics and show why fast
adoption of new technology in some cases squeezes out the incumbents, while in other cases
where the initial conditions seem similar, new technology fails to gain sufficient traction, and
incumbent retains its market position (or at least shares it with a new entrant).
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PRIMARY RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Dr. Chintan Vaishnav and Prof. Charles H. Fine from the Value Chain Dynamics Working Group
of the Communications Futures Program at MIT have developed a System Dynamics model
(Vaishnav, 2010) to understand how incumbents and entrants compete on:
* product level features such as price, quality, and innovations, and switching costs
" firm level features such as resources to innovation vs. resources to quality
" environment features such as sensitivity to innovation and quality and network
externalities.
The model considers the environment (or the market) as the battlefield where users constantly
filter different products and services and choose among them using set of preferences or
sensitivities to certain product features. Products have several dimensions or features that
appeal to customers: quality, or the reflection of maturity of the learning curve of the
technology, innovation, or the new level of performance that has not been offered before,
price, and network externality, or the reinforcement of product or service utility due to the
installed base of same or complementary products. The firms are characterized by available
resources, strategic decisions of when and how to allocate these resources and the level of
modularity or how much of the product or service is produced in cooperation with partners or
what part of the value chain is captured by the company. In addition, the companies' structure
is constantly (albeit sometimes quite slow) changing between integral and modular as
described by C. Fine in "Clockspeed" (Fine, 1999). By performing sensitivity analysis of the
model and calibrating it appropriately, Vaishnav and Fine have theoretically explained how
various outcomes arise in the face of an attacking innovation.
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However, the ultimate purpose of such a model, which is to help the companies select
appropriate strategy to compete better, requires better correlation of the theoretical data with
the empirical findings from the existing and new industry cases. The result of any entrant-
incumbent clash is defined not only by engineering features of a product (such as quality and
technological innovation), but also (and may be largely) by the dynamic response of the
management adjusting the resources and priorities of the organization. We suggest that the
environment or user preferences serve as a main filtering mechanism that assigns lesser or
greater leverage to these factors, thus defining the outcome. This study will attempt to identify
the patterns of such filtering for several typical scenarios and provide practical insights that
might be useful for product managers as well as top management of a company.
12
Chapter 1. THEORETICAL BASE AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL
In this chapter, a previous theoretical work discussing adoption challenges and opportunities of
new technologies is reviewed first. Then, we consider potential outcomes of clashes between
new entrant introducing disruptive technology and incumbent perfecting existing technology,
and define the scope of our framework. Next, we introduce the Incumbent's Dilemma
framework and discuss theoretical predictions using the System Dynamics model based on it.
HISTORICAL RETROSPECT
The literature on innovations is extensive, and offers rich material, where seminal works
complement and challenge each other over the course of last decades. Dosi compared the
natures of technologies and science and considered technological paradigms similar to scientific
paradigms. He differentiated between continuous changes and discontinuities in technological
innovations and offered a framework to understand the process of selection of new
technological paradigm. He also studied cumulativeness of technical advances as well as
uncertainty associated with technological shifts, and how the innovative process is shaped by
economic and institutional factors (Dosi, 1982). Teece considered boundaries of the firms and
the ownership of complementary assets as being crucial in capturing value from innovations.
He argued that in some cases innovating firms have to establish a prior position in
manufacturing and related capacities to be successful, and considered necessary trade and
economic policy implications (Teece, 1986). Tushman and Anderson talked about
differentiation between incremental changes and technological discontinuities that might
increase environmental uncertainty. They expanded the concept of innovation by introducing
13
competence-destroying and competence-enhancing discontinuities that are initiated by new or
existing firms accordingly, and affect the industrial order (Tushman & Anderson, 1986).
Henderson and Clark challenged the traditional categorization of innovations as either
incremental or radical, and introduced the idea of architectural innovation that destroys the
usefulness of existing knowledge of established firms and offers new firms opportunity to gain
significant advantage over incumbents (Henderson & Clark, 1990). The concept of disruptive
technology was first introduced by Bower and Christensen in 1995 (Bower & Christensen, 1995)
and further explored by Christensen in (Christensen, 1997), who described how large
companies typically ignore new technologies, as they often sacrifice traditional performance,
and thus are perceived as unattractive for mainstream customers. However, in time new
entrants become proficient in producing quality products alongside with new dimension of
performance (innovation) and eventually displace incumbents. Sood and Tellis used the data
from four different markets to challenge traditional S-shaped technology diffusion curve and
suggest that technological evolution follows a step function, where periods of sharp
improvements in performance are followed by long periods of no improvements. They showed
that new technologies might enter above or below the existing technologies and their paths
rarely cross just once. They also argued that new technologies come as much from new entrant
as from large incumbents (Sood & Tellis, 2005). These and other works (see Bibliography for full
list of references) have covered substantial part of the innovations landscape, however, no
comprehensive framework exploring all the possible factors and outcomes of innovative clashes
between incumbent and entrant has been thoroughly considered and theoretically studied. This
work attempts to fill the gap using empirical data and the Incumbent's Dilemma framework.
14
POTENTIAL OUTCOMES WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGY ENTERS THE MARKET
When considering buzzword "disruption," one must clearly understand what constitutes
disruption, and what the two different dimensions along which a disruption occurs are. Most of
the time, people understand disruption as the outcome when old company and old technology
is pushed out by a new company with new technology. However, this is only one possible
scenario where no differentiation between industrial disruption and technological disruption is
made.
All cases of disruption can be categorized using three main outcomes (disruption, co-existence,
and no disruption) along two main dimensions - industrial order (or the players on the market)
and technology:
New technology loses (New entrant abandons it)
" New entrant quits the market, Incumbent retains market share
" New entrant adopts old technology, Coexistence of companies who share the same
market
" New entrant adopts old technology and wins, Incumbent loses market share
Coexistence of technologies
" New entrant uses new technology, Incumbent uses old technology
" Incumbent uses new technology, new entrant uses old technology (hardly possible)
New technology wins (Incumbent abandons old technology)
* Incumbent quits the market, New entrant wins market share
" Incumbent adopts new technology, Coexistence of companies who share the same
market
" Incumbent adopts new technology and wins, New entrant loses market share
15
All possible combinations of cases populated along these two dimensions - industrial and
technological disruption - are shown in Table 1-1.
Disruption
New technology wins
(Incumbent abandons
old technology)
(TD)
Coexistence
Both technologies
exist on the market
(TC)
No Disruption
New technology loses
(New entrant
abandons it)
(TN)
Disruption New entrant adopts
Incumbent Incumbent quits the old technology and
leaves the market, New entrant N/A wins, Incumbent loses
market wins market share market share
(ID) marketshare
1) New entrant uses
new technology,
Coexistence Incumbent uses old
Both New Incumbent adopts new technology New entrant adopts
entrant and technology, old technology,
Incumbent Coexistence of 2) Incumbent uses new Coexistence of
are on the companies, share the technology, New companies, share the
market same market entrant uses old same market
(IC) technology
No Disruption incumbent adopts newNew entrant New entrant quits thetechnology and wins,
cannotNew entrant loses N/A market, Incumbent
the market retains market share
(IN) market share
Table 1-1. Matrix of possible disruption scenarios
It is clear from the table that there are seven distinct outcomes possible. Two scenarios, TCID
and TCIN, are infeasible, as coexistence requires two companies (and two technologies), but
both ID and IN rows assume that one of the company leaves the market and it is hardly possible
that the remaining player starts using both technologies at the same time. Of the seven
16
scenarios that are left, TNID seems to be controversial, as it assumes that new company quickly
realizes immaturity of its new technology, abandons it, and adopts old technology. Moreover,
new entrant does it so well, that it perfects and uses old technology better than existing
companies do, which leads to the expelling of the existing companies from the market.
However unrealistic this might seem, in real life this is quite possible scenario, specifically
keeping in mind that new company might have a different complementary assets to the old
technology effectively improving value proposition of old technology to customers. Scenario
TNIC is much more likely, as here two companies coexist on the market. Very interesting
ongoing true real life example pertaining to these two scenarios is the new company
Numecent1 that is offering a technology called now "cloudpaging," which is the optimized for
mobile application version of old client-server technology. The outcome of adoption of this
technology is hard to predict so far, but this would be very interesting case to analyze in the
future research.
Scenarios TDIC and TDIN are more typical as they support the notion of the ultimate superiority
of a new technology and it is just the question of strategic action of the companies that define
whether there will be coexistence of companies or new entrant will quit the market.
The diagonal of the matrix, scenarios TDID, TCIC, TNIN are classical ones and this is what the
literature on innovation and disruption has been focused on. For the purposes of our case
studies, we tried to select the cases that fit the diagonal to keep the consistency with classical
1 http://numecent.com
17
interpretation of disruption. It is worth mentioning though, that other four scenarios are
equally important in current fast clock speed technology, as companies are looking for any
possibility to attract customers who eventually transform their loyalty into the market
dominance of well-informed player.
INCUMBENT's DILEMMA FRAMEWORK
Having defined all the possible outcomes of a clash between new and existing technology, we
are now ready to go one step further and talk about how we can predict the outcome and what
are the most influential factors and dynamics affecting it. The Incumbent's Dilemma framework
consists of two players, incumbent and new entrant, competing for the same customers by
NEW ENTRANT
~PROfiUCT/SE RVIC
Network
Externalities
Price
Quality
Innovation
Focus Structure
(Resources) (Modularityl
Market Share
4 ENV)RONMENT
(CUSTOMER)
Network
Sensitivity
Price
Sensitivity
Quality
Sensitivity II
Innovation I
Sensitivity
afI
I
L
I
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INCUMBENT
pPRODUCT/SE V T
Network
Externalities
Price
Quality
Innovation
Structure Focus
(Modularity) (Resources)
Market Share
ow
offering different features of a product/service. Typically, new entrant has more emphasis on
Innovation (or new dimensions of performance), while incumbent improves Quality (perfects
existing dimensions of performance, or features).
The variables of the framework are split in two main parts. Current positions describe static
factors, reflecting the actual positions of the players. Dynamic behavior is the reflection of
players' strategic decisions.
NEW ENTRANT
Firm-evel Factors Product-leve Product-level Finn-level Factors
Factors Factors
CURRENT POSITIONS
Fixed Costs Price Price Sensitivity Price Fixed Costs
(SoA to Price)
1 6 11 17 22
Marginal Costs Quality Quality Sensitivity Quality Marginal Costs
(SoA to Quality)
2 7 12 1 23
Resources to Quality Innovation Innovation Sensitivity Innovation Resources to Quality
(SoA to Innovation)
3 8 13 19 24
Resources to Innovation Network Effect SoA to Installed Base Network Effect Resources to Innovation
4 9 14 20 25
Modularity Switching Costs Contact Rate Switching Costs Modularity
5 10 15 21 26
Word of Mouth
16
DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR (RESPONSE to COMPETITION)
Time to Develop Quality Complementary Assets Time to Develop Quality /Complementary Assets
27 32 N/A
Time to Innovate Time to Innovate
28 N/A
Resource Reorientation Time Resource Reorientation Time
29 34
Rate of Modularization/Contracting Rate of Modularizatlon/Contracting
30 35
Rate of lntegration/Mergers Rate of Integration/Mergers
31 36
Table 1-3. Incumbent's dilemma framework variables
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CURRENT POSITIONS
NEW ENTRANT F-level factors
1) Fixed Costs: Costs of setting up the manufacturing of the product regardless of the
number of units produced. The business expenses, which are not dependent on the
level of goods or services produced by the business.
2) Marginal Costs: Costs of manufacturing of every additional unit of the product. The
change in total cost that arises when the quantity produced changes by one unit.
3) Resources to Quality: Available resources to create quality product (current
manufacturing base, supply chain, employees).
4) Resources to Innovation: Available resources to create an innovative product and
maintain innovation level (R&D, Patents).
5) Modularity: Degree of modularity of the product architecture and its ownership.
NEW ENTRANT P-level factors
6) Price: Price of the product on the market.
7) Quality: Quality of the product. Ability of the product/service to perform or deliver
primary functions.
8) Innovation: Level of innovation offered by the product. Ability of the product/service
to perform or deliver ancillary functions.
9) Network Effect: Cumulative product potential to create direct or indirect network
effect (utility function based). Direct network effect is the degree, at which the
utility of the product depends on the similar products installed and working. Indirect
20
network effect is the degree at which the utility of the product can be created due to
complementary products installed and working.
10) Switching Costs: How costly it is to walk away from new product. May be due to
unique features of the product as well as due to contractual obligations.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS (Market analysis)
11) Price Sensitivity (SoA to Price): How important for the users is the price level of the
product.
12) Quality Sensitivity (SoA to Quality): How important for the users is the quality of the
product.
13) Innovation Sensitivity (SoA to Innovation): How important for the users is the level of
innovation, offered by the product. In other words, how much do users want the
innovation?
14) SoA to Installed Base: Degree, at which customers care about the network effect
(will they want to use its benefits?).
15) Contact Rate: How frequently users interact with each other.
16) Word of Mouth: Degree of influence of other users' opinions on buyers' decision.
INCUMBENT P-level factors
17) Price: Price of the product on the market.
18) Quality: Quality of the product.
19) Innovation: Level of innovation offered by the product.
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20) Network Effect: Cumulative product potential to create direct or indirect network
effect (utility function based). Direct network effect is the degree, at which the
utility of the product depends on the similar products installed and working. Indirect
network effect is the degree at which the utility of the product can be created due to
complementary products installed and working.
21) Switching Costs: How costly it is to walk away from current product. May be due to
unique features of the product as well as due to contractual obligations.
INCUMBENT F-level factors
22) Fixed Costs: Costs of setting up the manufacturing of the product regardless of the
number of units produced.
23) Marginal Costs: Costs of manufacturing of every additional unit of the product.
24) Resources to Quality: Available resources to create quality product (current
manufacturing base, supply chain, employees).
25) Resources to Innovation: Available resources to create innovative product (R&D,
Patents).
26) Modularity: Degree of modularity of the product architecture and its ownership.
DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR (RESPONSE to COMPETITION)
NEW ENTRANT
27) Time to Develop Quality/Complementary Assets: Time required by new entrants to
develop the quality, currently offered by incumbents.
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28) Time to Innovate: Not applicable to new entrants in the beginning, as it is the time
required by incumbent to develop innovation that new entrant offers from the
beginning. When new entrant matures and becomes incumbent, this factor becomes
relevant.
29) Resource Reorientation Time: Time required to re-allocate firm's resources from
focusing on pure innovation to delivering high quality.
30) Rate of Modularization/Contracting: Rate of increase in reliance on outsourcing.
31) Rate of Integration/Mergers: Rate of increase in reliance on own resources.
INCUMBENT
32) Time to Develop Quality/Complementary Assets: Not applicable to incumbents in the
beginning, as this the time required by new entrants to develop the quality,
currently offered by incumbents. When incumbent creates a new technology and
effectively becomes a new entrant, this factor becomes relevant.
33) Time to Innovate: Time required by incumbent to develop the innovation that new
entrant offers from the beginning.
34) Resource Reorientation Time: Time required to re-allocate firm's resources from
focusing on quality with old product to innovation.
35) Rate of Modularization/Contracting: Rate of increase in reliance on outsourcing.
36) Rate of Integration/Mergers: Rate of increase in reliance on own resources
Factors 27-28, 32-33 are possible to estimate based on common sense and knowledge of the
technology.
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Factors 29-31, 34-36 reflect strategic behavior of the company and managerial response, hence
they are impossible to estimate beforehand.
Although we can almost correctly define factors 5 and 26 (snapshot data), factors 29-31 and 34-
36 (time and rates of change) are very much hidden from the outside observer as we can only
use publicly available data, which rarely contain this information treated by many companies as
private. In rare cases, we can try to speculate, but the accurate measurements are only possible
if firm is willing to cooperate and disclose its internal processes. They are used to model the
dynamic behavior of the players once the new entrants come to the market field.
Factors 17 and 18 are separated, although in the model more complex equation based on
Quality per Price is utilized.
Exact data of factors 1-2, 22-23 is also internal, but it can be reliably evaluated or otherwise
derived from the common knowledge of the technology.
24
THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS FROM SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODEL
The sensitivity analysis of the model (Vaishnav, 2010) predicts certain outcomes without even
talking about concrete cases. Table 1-4 summarizes prediction of outcomes for different
"standard" scenarios based on model assumptions and dynamics.
The most straightforward interpretation of these results for an actual case is when all of the
factors (firm, product, and environment) are in the same column. For example, consider column
one when an entrant company has superior cost structure, its product has high innovation
features, and consumers care about high level of innovation and are willing to ignore some
quality gap in the beginning. This is definitive disruption scenario and one can reasonably
expect to have it confirmed by data and market. This is not to say, however, that an incumbent
cannot regroup and offer better deal to customers or that another technology cannot emerge
and displace the winner, which is very often the case in high clockspeed markets.
Things become more complicated though, when some of the factors are suggesting disruption,
while others lean towards the no-disruption column. The outcome of such cases depends
largely on the dynamic response of the players to the actions of each other. In order to analyze
such a case, one would need to gather all the data required for the model and make intelligent
assumptions whenever the data is hard to quantify.
25
* Entrants have far
superior cost
structure
" Weak Network Effect
" High Innovation and
Quality
* Consumers highly
price sensitive and
willing to adopt
innovations with low
quality and
compatibility
* (Alternatively)
consumers value
quality, but entrants
introduce a product
with strong network
effect
" Incumbents innovate,
restructure while
maintaining quality
O Incumbents have far
* Entrants struggle to superior cost
offer quality due to structure
lack of
complementary assets
or market power
" No Network Effect
* Incumbents can affect * Strong Network Effect
switching behavior
heavily
* Consumers value
quality and
compatibility over
* Consumers value innovation and low
availability over prce
quality/innovation, or
are willing to tradeoff * (Alternatively)
consumers valuequality and innovation innovation, but
incumbent's product
has strong network
effect
Table 1-4. Theoretical Lessons from the System Dynamics Model
Another dimension that has to be considered when applying the model is to separate the
technology disruption from industry disruption (see discussion earlier in this chapter). To
summarize, technology disruption means that a new technology substitutes the old technology
26
and users get new dimensions of quality and innovation with new product or service. Industry
disruption means the incumbent company exits the market and the new entrant takes over the
customers. Theoretical literature and our framework have been focusing on the cases where a
technology and industry disruption happens at the same time. However, it can be easily
possible that an incumbent reacts quickly and adopts innovation abandoning old technology,
thus becoming new supplier of innovative product or provider of innovative service. Such cases
mostly require incumbents cannibalizing their own products and need accurate data in order to
properly accommodate them for our framework and system dynamics model.
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Chapter 2. CASE STUDIES
In this chapter, we describe the research method we are using in our analysis. We then show
how our framework can be applied using limited number of publicly available information and
illustrate it with two examples. Next, we describe our approach to the selection of case studies
used in this work, and finally, we analyze seven case studies (two pairs of historical cases and
three case studies that are more recent and were selected and analyzed in cooperation with
Communications Futures Program at MIT).
RESEARCH METHODS & APPROACHES
There are number of research methods available for a researcher who wants to understand
complex phenomena or to test a theory - case study, experiment, survey, archival records,
history, etc. Among them, the case study is one of the most challenging methods. As Yin points
out, "the case study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful
characteristics of real-life events - such as individual life cycles, organizational and managerial
processes, neighborhood change, international relations, and the maturation of industries"
(Yin, 2009). Many researchers consider hierarchical approach to methods, where the case study
serves as the preliminary strategy that cannot be used to test or describe the phenomena. In
other words, the case study is often considered as only exploratory strategy, while for the
descriptive and explanatory strategy other methods are preferred. However, more holistic,
inclusive approach is advantageous. It considers all the strategies as mutually complementing,
and suggests that purpose of the research and questions that need to be answered define the
appropriate research strategy.
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The conditions that affect the choice of the research method are:
" Type of research questions
" Ability to control the events
" Degree of focus on historical vs. contemporary events
Summary of these conditions and appropriate research strategies are shown below in Table 2-1
(adapted from (Yin, 2009)).
Experiment
Survey
Archival analysis
History
Case study
how, why? Yes Yes
who, what, where, No Yes
how many, how
much?
who, what, where, No Yes/No
how many, how
much?
how, why? No No
how, why?- No Yes
Table 2-1. Research Strategies
As can be seen from the table, research strategies are not mutually exclusive, but there are
certain distinct advantages of the case study. As a research method, it is mostly beneficial when
a researcher is looking for answers to questions "how" and "why," and is focusing on
contemporary events, over which a researcher has little or no control, but where data is readily
available, or where direct observation and interviews are possible to complement missing data
(Yin, 2009).
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Since the goal of this work is to understand the dynamics and various factors affecting the
outcomes, or the links of the events in time that lead to certain outcomes, we are trying to
answer the questions "how" and "why" that are explanatory, and this is exactly why we are
choosing the case study as opposed to experiment or survey. The following is the list of
questions that we are trying to answer in our case studies:
1. Why new technologies not always substitute old ones and sometimes there is a
coexistence of technologies?
2. Why some new entrants win, while others fail, and incumbent retains leading
position?
3. How can we predict the outcome of the interplay between innovation and quality?
4. How user needs are changing in time, and how can companies capture this change
and reflect in their strategy?
To collect the data, we will define the comprehensive list of study questions. The case study will
be designed as Multiple-case with multiple units of analysis. The Static part of the cases will
consider Firm-level factors, Product-level factors and Environment factors as defined in the
Incumbent's Dilemma framework. The Dynamic response part will consider Firm-level factors
and Environmental factors in form of changing user needs. Each case must be carefully selected
to predict either similar results (literal replication) or contrasting results for anticipatable
reasons (theoretical replication) (Yin, 2009).
To ensure quality of our research, we will challenge our Research Design against
* Construct validity, by using multiple sources of evidence, chain of evidence
* Internal validity, by using pattern matching, explanation building, rival explanations,
logic models
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* External validity, by applying theory and replication logic (for multiple-case studies)
* Reliability, by maintaining case study protocol, case study database
The reports of the case studies would serve as the empirical evidences of the validity of the
framework and help us to identify its flaws and methods of their mitigation. Conclusions and
results of this work would be instrumental for any manager of the company (large or small)
seeking to understand how to respond to new technologies to defend its market share and
remain competitive, or what should be the new product/service features in order to challenge
the incumbents.
FRAMEWORK APPLICATION FOR PUBLICLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION
To validate the framework, we first have analyzed several cases that were mentioned in The
New York Times over the period from 1999 to 2008. The analysis was based solely on the
information mentioned in the articles and the data available at the date of publications. Full list
of analyzed cases and two detailed examples are shown below. As can be clearly seen, in many
cases the information is rather scarce and does not mention the emergence of viable
commercial technology, but describes the scientific discovery that might be far from the
industrial diffusion.
Potentially Disruptive Industry Year Incumbent (market share)
Tech.nology
Organic LED Electronic Equipment 1999 Samsung (14.5%),
Manufacturers Sharp (13.9%),
LCD/TFT Screens Philips (12.7%)
Nano science in chip Semiconductor Equipment 1999 Intel ($26bn)
manufacturing NEC ($9bn)
Toshiba ($7.6bn)
Samsung ($7.1bn)
Texas Instruments ($7.1bn)
Motorola ($6.4bn)
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Open Source Software Computers: Systems
Online Book Stores
Software
IP protected software
Retail, Internet Services
Book sales
e-Port (Internet-based Advertising, Internet
Advertising)
Digital Photography
Gigabit Ethernet
Online Investment
Firms
Online Journals
WiFi Mesh Networks
Services
Traditional Media
Photographic Products
Communications 2C
Equipment
Investment Banking and 2C
Brokerage
Traditional Mutual Funds
Publishing 2C
Traditional subscription &
Archives
2000 Bertelsmann (Random House)
Rupert Murdoch's News Corp,
Time Warner,
Disney,
Viacom/CBS
2000 TV, Newspapers, Magazines
2000 Kodak,
Fujifilm,
Polaroid
00 Cisco,
3Com
00 Vanguard (mentioned in the article)
101 Random House: $2.1 billion
worldwide
Penguin Group: $1.3 billion
HarperCollins $1.1 billion
Simon & Schuster: $690 million
AOL/Time Warner: $415 million
Wireless 2002 AT&T,
Telecommunications
Services
Segway Scooter Automobile Manufacturer
Internal Combustion Engine
Alternative Energy - Oil and Gas Exploration and
Solar, Biomass, Wind, Services, Electrical Utilities
Hydrogen
P2P Service Providers Telecommunications
Service
Long Distance Calls
Verizon,
Sprint,
T-Mobile,
Cingular,
Nextel
2002 GM,
Ford,
Chrysler
2003 Exxon-Mobil,
BP,
Chevron
2004 AT&T-Cingular,
Verizon,
Sprint
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2000 Microsoft
P2P File Sharing Movies and Home
Entertainment
Online Shopping
Online Book Content
Online Commodity
Futures Exchange
YouTube (Political
Advertising)
YouTube (Video
Content Distribution)
Paint Films
Advertising using
Social Networks
Retail
Publishing
Libraries
Commodity Futures
Exchange
Advertising
Movies and Entertainment,
Publishing
Auto Parts and Equipment
Lacquer Paint
Advertising
2005 Warner Bros,
Buena Vista,
Columbia,
Universal,
Fox,
Paramount,
MGM
2005 Wal-Mart (mentioned in the article)
2006 Reed Elsevier,
Pearson,
Thomson,
Bertelsmann,
Wolters Kluer,
McGraw-Hill Education
2006 NYMEX - New York Mercantile
Exchange (mentioned in the article)
2006 TV, Newspapers, Magazines
2006 The same
2007 AkzoNobel,
PPG Industries,
DuPont
2008 TV, Newspapers, Magazines
Table 2-2. List of Publicly Available Cases
Data and rankings used in the analysis are based on the following sources:
http://www.telecompaper.com/news/samsung-holds-145-of-tft-lcd-market-in-1999
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiconductor sales leaders by year#Ranking for year 1999
http://www.parapublishing.com/sites/para/resources/statistics.cfm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photographic film
http://business.highbeam.com/industry-reports/equipment/photographic-equipment-supplies
http://www.wintergreenresearch.com/reports/Wireless Services.htm
http://www.iab.net/media/file/resources pdf ADR 021028.pdf
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05apr/RL32883.pdf
http://www.localenergty.orgz/pdfs/Document%/2OLibrary/Exxon%/2OFuture%/2OoP/%2O0i1 %20and
%20Gas.pdf
http://www.petrostrategies.or/Links/Worlds Largest Oil and Gas Companies Sites.htm
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http://www.skiIlset.org/film/knowledge/article 5082 1.asp
http://www.pcimag.com/HTML/BNP GUID 9-5-2006 A 10000000000000375750
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samsung
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel 4004
http:/Ien.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel Corporation
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft
http:/Ien.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT%26T Wireless Services
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AT%26T Corp.
The complete list of detailed analysis for each case is available upon request at
snaumovC@sloan.mit.edu
34
Organic LED, 19992
Industry: Electronic Equipment Manufacturers (Computer screens, mobile devices)
Incumbent: TFT LCD - Samsung, Market share 14.5% of global TFT LCD market in 19993
New Entrant: Philips ElectroniCS4
Fixed Costs Price
High
Marginal Costs
Low
Resources to Quality
High
Resources to Innovation
High
Modularity
Low
Low
Quality
Low
Innovation
Very High
Network Effect
Medium
Switching Costs
Low
CURRENT POSITIONS
Price Sensitivity
(SoA to Price)
High
Quality Sensitivity
(SoA to Quality)
High-
Innovation Sensitivity
(SoA to Innovation)
High
SoA to Installed Base
High
Contact Rate
Medium
Word of Mouth
Price Fixed Costs
High
Quality
Medium
Innovation
High
Network Effect
Low
Switching Costs
LOW
High
Marginal Costs
Low
Resources to Quality
High
Resources to Innovation
High
Modularity
Low
Low
DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR (RESPONSE to COMPETITION)
Time to Develop Quality / Complementary Time to Develop Quality / Complementary
Assets Assets
3-5 years N/A
Time to Innovate Time to Innovate
N/A
Resource Reorientation Time
Rate of Modularization/Contracting
Low
Rate of Integration/Mergers,
High
2-3 years
Resource Reorientation Time
Rate of Modularization/Contracting
Low
Rate of Integration/Mergers
High
2 All the tables in this and all other cases are based on the data available at the date of the case indicated. No later
information was used to correct the factors
3 Samsung holds 14.5% of TFT LCD market in 1999, 18 July 2000, Telecompaper,
http://www.telecompaper.com/news/samsung-holds-145-of-tft-lcd-market-in-1999 Accessed 2013
4 Vivid Colors in the Palm of Your Hand, Anne Eisenberg, August 5, 1999, The New York Times
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CURRENT POSITIONS
NEW ENTRANT F-level
Fixed Costs: High, Large spending on R&D.
Marginal Costs: Low, Economies of scale after ramp up.
Resources to Quality: High, Alliances created with research groups. Uniax licensed a technology
for using light-emitting polymers for flat panel displays to Philips.
Resources to Innovation: High, 16.3% of total sales are spent on R&D 5
Modularity: Low, Large corporation with a lot of integrated activities.
NEW ENTRANT P-level
Price: Low, Easy to manufacture and require fewer components.
Quality: Low, Initial quality is low, only for displays with little information, problems with plastic
base, permeable to oxygen and water vapor.
Innovation: Very High, Ability to shape into any form, flexible, robust, easy to manufacture, do
not require a light source as they emit color light.
Network Effect: Medium, No direct network effect. Medium indirect network effect: larger
customer base will force developers of applications and content providers to start using new
features of the product (colors, resolution etc.) and the experience of the customers will be
much better.
Switching Costs: Low, Initially, new entrants' product will be forced to have the same interface
to ensure easier switching TO this product. However, later new versions might offer some
features, requiring new proprietary interface. If the market share will be big, then switching
costs might be high. Another possible source of switching costs is content providers, who might
be locked to the particular feature. However, this should not be considered as a strong factor,
as content providers are typically flexible and are willing to upgrade their content to keep up
with new technologies and capture new sales (example HD vs. SD TV).
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Price Sensitivity (SoA to Price): High, Prices must remain low to capture mobile phones market
(OEM). This is also true for end customers (computer monitors).
s Philips Annual report 1999, http://www.philips.com/shared/assets/Downloadablefile/ManagementReport AR99-
12931.pdf Accessed 2013
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Quality Sensitivity (SoA to Quality): High, Quality color screens demanded for new generation
of mobile devices and advertising as well as PCs.
Innovation Sensitivity (SoA to Innovation): High, New technologies are requested by high tech
devices.
SoA to Installed Base: High, Customers care a lot about the content and apps to maximize their
experience.
Contact Rate: Medium, Everyday casual contacts schedule.
Word of Mouth: High, Ability to produce vivid colors and flexibility will attract new customers
and they will share their opinion with others.
INCUMBENT P-level
Price: High, TFT LCD screens are still in the very early phase and marketing still positions them
as superior elite screens (as opposed to CRT). Costs of manufacturing are high, and the learning
curve is not yet developed.
Quality: Medium, Technology offers outstanding features such as improved image quality, but
colors are far worse than CRT. Designers do not use TFT screens. TFT displays require a light
source.
Innovation: High, Lightweight and flat, low power consumption (might start as ancillary, but is
moving to become one of the primary performance factors).
Network Effect: Low, No direct or indirect network effect.
Switching Costs: Low, Initially used for advertising screens, later for TV and computer screens.
The same interface, therefore no disruption in standards and low switching costs.
INCUMBENT F-level
Fixed Costs: High, Large spending on R&D.
Marginal Costs: Low, Economies of scale.
Resources to Quality: High, Great manufacturing base and production standards, partnerships6 .
Resources to Innovation: High, R&D spending 6.1% of sales in 19997.
Modularity: Low, Large corporation with a lot of integrated activities.
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samsung Corning Precision Glass, Accessed 2013
Samsung Annual report 1999,
http://www.samsung.com/us/aboutsamsung/corporateprofile/download/all 1999.pdf Accessed 2013
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DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR (RESPONSE to COMPETITION)
NEW ENTRANT
Time to Develop Quality/Complementary Assets: 3-5 years to laptop screens, longer (not
specified) for wall-screens.
Rate of Modularization/Contracting: Low, IP issues prevent reliance on outsourcing, trend to
consolidate activities.
Rate of Integration/Mergers: High, M&A strategy.
INCUMBENT
Time to Innovate: 2-3 years given large R&D base. Established LCD panel R&D Line in Kiheung8 .
Rate of Modularization/Contracting: Low, Large international corporation with the trend to
consolidate activities.
Rate of Integration/Mergers: High, M&A strategy.
Predicted outcome: Co-existence of technologies and industrial order (TCIC) with possibility for
technology disruption (TDxx), depending on the speed of achieving necessary quality.
8 http://www.samsung.com/Rlobal/business/lcdpanel/aboutus/AboutUs 1999-1991.html. Accessed 2012
38
P2P Service Providers, 2004
Industry: Telecommunications Service. Long Distance Calls, PSTN
Incumbent: AT&T-Cingular9
New Entrant: Skypel'
Fixed Costs Price
Low
Marginal Costs
Low
Resources to Quality
Low
Resources to Innovation
Low
Modularity
Very Low
Quality
Medium
innovation
High
Network Effect
High
Switching Costs
CURRENT POSITIONS
Price Sensitivity
(SoA to Price)
Quality Sensitivity
(SoA to Quality)
Medium
Innovation Sensitivity
(SoA to Innovation)
High
SoA to Installed Base
High
Contact Rate
Price Fixed Costs
High
Quality
Medium
Innovation
High
Network Effect
High
Switching Costs
High
Marginal Costs
Very Low
Resources to Quality
High
Resources to Innovation
High
Modularity
Low Low Medium Medium Low
Word of Mouth
DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR (RESPONSE to COMPETITION)
Time to Develop Quality / Complementary Time to Develop Quality
Assets Assets
Depends on the Internet infrastructure N/A
Time to Innovate Time to Innovate
N/A 1year
Resource Reorientation Time Resource Reorientation Time
N/A
Rate of Modularization/Contracting Rate of Modularization/Contr
Medium Low
Rate of Integration/Mergers Rate of Integration/Mergers
Low High
/ Complementary
acting
9 http://www.wintergreenresearch.com/reports/Wireless Services.htm Accessed 2013
10 In Internet Calling, Skype Is Living Up to the Hype, James Fallows, The New York Times, September 5, 2004
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CURRENT POSITIONS
NEW ENTRANT F-level
Fixed Costs: Low, P2P network does not require large CAPEX.
Marginal Costs: Low, P2P networks are easily scalable by adding few control servers/sites.
Resources to Quality: Low, Start-up company founded in 2003".
Resources to Innovation: Low, Start-up company.
Modularity: Low, Start-up company.
NEW ENTRANT P-level
Price: Very Low, PC to PC calls are free, SkypeOut (to a phone) is very low priced.
Quality: Medium, Largely depends on the bandwidth of Internet connection between two
peers.
Innovation: High, Completely new type of communication (VoIP).
Network Effect: High, Medium direct network effect. High indirect network effect. If all calling
parties have Skype accounts, they can establish free video calls, which increases customer
experience.
Switching Costs: Low, It does not take a lot of time to switch to new technology.
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Price Sensitivity (SoA to Price): High, As people tend to travel more, cheap long distance calls
are very important.
Quality Sensitivity (SoA to Quality): Medium, Voice quality is generally enough (in worst cases
it is comparable to PSTN). Quality requirements rise though when it comes to businesses, which
require reliable and lag-free teleconferencing.
Innovation Sensitivity (SoA to Innovation): High, There is a constant need to improve
communication among people and serve international businesses.
SoA to Installed Base: High, Everybody loves to have free video calls.
Contact Rate: Medium, Everyday casual contacts schedule.
Word of Mouth: High, Very high role of WOM and strong incentive to use Skype as customer
base is growing and people's contacts migrate to Skype.
INCUMBENT P-level
Price: High, Prior to VoIP there was no alternative publicly available mean of connecting people,
so the prices for long distance calls were very high.
Quality: Medium, Depending on the regions. To some countries long distance calls were very
bad. US was generally high quality.
1 http://en.wikipedia.or/wiki/Skvpe Accessed 2013
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Innovation: High, Initial phone invention was great innovation, PSTN solved problem of speed
of connection -- long distance connections between major cities could take up to seven minutes
prior to PSTN1.
Network Effect: High, High direct and indirect network effect. There must be a network of
phone lines in order to make calls. Customers benefit from more phone users -- can call
sanybody and solve anything.
Switching Costs: Medium, Customers are bound by contractual obligations.
INCUMBENT F-level
Fixed Costs: High, large spending on R&D.
Marginal Costs: Very Low, Once network was built, costs per additional line were low within the
capacity of the line.
Resources to Quality: High, Large company with a long history and almost a monopoly in the
phone calls. New company was founded in 1983 because of anti-trust suit1.
Resources to Innovation: High, SBC Laboratories (AT&T Labs) perform R&D.
Modularity: Low, Large corporation with a lot of integrated activities.
DYNAMIC BEHAVIOR (RESPONSE to COMPETITION)
NEW ENTRANT
Time to Develop Quality/Complementary Assets: Depends on the Internet infrastructure.
Speed and complementary features depend on the bandwidth/availability of the Internet
connection and the activity of other players.
Rate of Modularization/Contracting: Medium, Reliance on own development team. Tendency
toward cooperation with social networks and other sites to incorporate Skype features in web
sites to make calls easier.
Rate of Integration/Mergers: Low, Start-up company with no sufficient funds to compete
alone.
INCUMBENT
Time to Innovate: The technology is simple. Can be done very quickly provided company's
desire to do so.
Rate of Modularization/Contracting: Low, Company tries to control everything -- cables,
switching network and customer's database.
Rate of Integration/Mergers: High, series of mergers and acquisitions throughout the history.
12 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PSTN network topology, Accessed 2013
13 http://en.wikipedia.ora/wiki/AT%26T Accessed 2013
14 http:/Iwww.corp.att.com/attlabs/about/ Accessed 2013
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Comment: Infrastructure of the Internet is an enabler and developed much faster without any
efforts from Skype. This allowed new technology to become widely used. Many long-distance
companies are using VoIP technology to lower the cost of their service.
Predicted outcome: Potential disruption of technology, potential disruption of industrial order
(TDID).
CASE STUDY SELECTION
We have further continued to work on the Incumbent's dilemma framework by exploring and
researching in details two pairs of empirical cases (Table 2-3) that had happened in the past and
for which the outcome is known and not debatable. We use case studies to show why in some
situations incumbents retain market share, while in others new entrants drive them out. We
show how a single firm flourishes with an old technology but struggles in the face of a radical
new technology; how a single technology disrupts one market environment, but struggles to
disrupt another; and how a single environment reacts differently to an old vs. a new
technology.
The reason for studying cases in pairs is to eliminate some of the difficulties discussed above
and related to the data that is not readily and indisputably quantifiable. In addition, when
studying cases in pairs, we get better understanding of the drivers working in each of the case.
By picking two cases with one similar set of drivers, but with different outcomes, we can
eliminate the effect of this one set of factors and look at two others sets of factors to see which
one defines the outcome of the case (disruption, coexistence, or no disruption).
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For example, In Linux vs. Windows case, we have the same firms and virtually the same
product, but the rate of adoption, and dynamics, are different, and so is the outcome of the
potential disruption.
Selection Logic Case Entrant vs. Incumbenti
1. Linux in desktop market (compared to) Linux vs. Windows
Same Product Windows in desktop market (desktop OS)
Same Firm 2. Linux in server market (compared to) Linux vs. Windows
Windows in server market (server OS)
1. Mobile handset market (basic phones) Nokia vs. Motorola
Same
Environment 2. Mobile handset market (Smartphones) Apple/Android vs.
Nokia/Motorola
Table 2-3. Pairs of Historical Cases
As a next step, we have decided to apply the framework to most recent cases. By doing so, we
were hoping to explore the predictive potential of the model. Although empirical cases are
great source of data for validation of the model, because the outcome of such a case is known,
there are very interesting questions that can be answered only when studying ongoing cases.
When studying historical cases, our goal was to analyze and improve the model, whereas our
objectives for ongoing cases were different, as we wanted to explore the challenges of defining
the cases and working within the boundaries of real time data that can be obtained by looking
at the problem from daily manager's perspective. In other words, in this exercise, we put
ourselves in manager's chair and attempted to predict the outcome of the case using the data
that we have.
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We chose to work with cases that are for the most interest for CFP members to make sure they
receive some benefits from this work in forms of better understanding of the situation or at
least looking at it through the lens of our model. We asked CFP members to provide us with the
short description of disruptive scenarios they have encountered. To further investigate
necessary details of the case, we have decided to create a survey that would help elicit
information about each of the factors without having to explain the nature of the interaction
among the factors simulated in the model (see Appendix A. The Incumbent's Dilemma: Case
Study Survey). In this chapter, we present three cases that resulted from such work (Table 2-4).
First case of digital music strictly speaking may fall in the category of empirical cases from the
past with known outcome. However, due to a lot of uncertainty in data and ongoing
"digitalization" of the industry as a whole (i.e. video content case which is presented in (Klym,
2013)), it is better aligned with two ongoing cases, which we present next, telecom providers
and wireless vs. wireline data.
Type Case
Historical/impact on ongoing adjacent cases Digital Music
Ongoing Telecom Providers
Ongoing Wireless vs. Wireline Data
Table 2-4. CFP Cases
Full mapping of the cases to the landscape of possible disruption scenarios is shown in Table
2-5 below. As we initially decided, we cover mostly the diagonal of the table, as this is what
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innovation literature has been mostly discussing in the past and thus we can better validate our
findings.
Disruption
New technology wins
(Incumbent abandons
old technology)
(TD)
TECHNOLOGY
Coexistence
Both technologies
exist on the market
(TC)
No Disruption
New technology loses
(New entrant
abandons it)
(TN)
Disruption Nokia vs. Motorola
Incumbent Apple/Android vs.leaves the Nokia/Motorola N/A
market
(ID) Telecom Providers
Coexistence
Both New Linux vs. Windows
entrant and (server OS)
Incumbent Digital Music
are on the Wireless vs. Wireline
market Data
(IC)
No Disruption
New entrant Linux vs. Windows
cannot enter N/A (desktop OS)
the market
(IN)
Table 2-5. Mapping of Cases to Disruption Scenarios
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OPERATING SYSTEMS, LINUX VS. WINDOWS
Operating systems market is one of the rarest markets where virtually the same product (or at
least technology) of the same firms can be analyzed in two different environments - desktop
OS and server OS - where the outcome was completely different. In fact, the outcome is so
overwhelmingly clear, without any boundary conditions, that it is extremely good case for
analysis of dynamics and factors of these clashes. We will see that the main difference was due
to different sensitivities of the users, i.e. different set of values that users apply to evaluate the
product and make a buy decision. We will first consider desktop market.
DESKTOP OPERATING SYSTEM
The incumbent in our first case is straightforward. Microsoft Corporation is the only developer
of Windows Operating System. The entrant situation is slightly more complex. There are more
than 30 Linux-based distributions of desktop OS with top 10 most widely used'5 . Ubuntu is by
far the most popular desktop distribution, while Fedora is one of the most innovative
distributions available today. Hence, two companies manufacturing these distributions,
Canonical Ltd. / Ubuntu Foundation and Red Hat, Inc. are jointly considered as an entrant.
Reasonable starting point for this case is 2004. Although Windows XP was released far ahead of
this time (2001), first releases of Ubuntu and Fedora appeared in 2004, and Windows XP had
substantial improvement in functionality with SP2 released in 2004.
15 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison of Linux distributions, Accessed 2013,
http://distrowatch.com/dwres.php?resource=major, Accessed 2013
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According to ComScore, in 2010 the average American spent 32 hours per month on the
Internet, and ages 45-54 had spent more than 39 hours online each month. Therefore, the
statistics of client OS based on the information supplied to web servers by web browsers,
seems to be sufficiently reliable. Although there are some critique to this method, accusing it
first of all of over or under estimation due to the behavior of some browsers or short revisits by
users or caching at browsers' sites, the Table 2-6 shows pretty good convergence for Windows
with extremes at 74.20% and 92.23%. The data for Linux is more dispersed, with two extremes
at 0.71% and 5.03%. Interestingly, the median for Linux is farther from the mean in comparison
to Windows case. This means the extreme high numbers for Linux are probably outliers and not
typically present in the sample. This gives us the reason to be more conservative in our
estimates of true market share of Linux.
16 http://www.comscoredatamine.com/2011/01/average-time-spent-online-per-u-s-visitor-in-2010/, Accessed
2013
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StatCounter'' March, 2012 89.21% 0.82%
W3Schools 8  January, 2012 83.90% 4.90%
Wikimedia" January, 2012 74.20% 4.44%
W3Counter October, 2011 80.11% 1.65%
StatOwI2 January, 2012 83.39% 0.71%
GetClicky2 March, 2012 84.32% 1.12%
ChitikaU February, 2012 83.65% 5.03%
AT Internet 4  November, 2011 86.20% 0.90%
NetMarketShares November, 2011 92.23% 1.31%
Median 83.90% 1.31%
Mean 84.13% 2.32%
Standard Deviation 4.85% 1.77%
Table 2-6. Market Share by Browser Usage
Below we have analyzed the data provided by http://www.netmarketshare.com
http://www.statcounter.com and http://www.w3schools.com in more details and found them
sufficiently consistent. The variation between first two sources is in the range of less than +/-1%
and can, therefore be considered as significantly reliable. Third source provides consistent data
for Windows market share, but gives higher share for Linux based OSs, about 4.8%. It is worth
noting, that this is the highest number found on the Internet, and this is the exception
17 http://gs.statcounter.com/#os-ww-monthly-200807-201203 Accessed 2013
18 http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers os.asp Accessed 2013
19 http://stats.wikimedia.org/archive/squid reports/2011-12/SquidReportOperatingSvstems.htm, Accessed 201320 http://www.w3counter.com/globalstats.php?vear=2011&month=10 Accessed 2013
2 http://statowl.com/operating system market share by os version.phptimeframe=1ast 6&interval=month&ch
art id=4&fltr br=&fltr os=&fltr se=&fltr cn=&Iimit[l=windows&limit[l=mac&limit[l=linux&x=95&y=38 Accessed
2013
22 http://getclicky.com/marketshare/global/operating-systems/ Accessed 2013
23 http://insights.chitika.com/2012/operating-system-report-february-2012-update/, Accessed 2013
24 http://www.atinternet.com/en/Documents/ios-continues-its-growth-in-europe/, Accessed 2013
2s http://www.netmarketshare.com/operatina-system-market-
share.aspx?qarid=9&qpcustomb=0&agtimeframe=M&qasp=130&qpno=25, Accessed 2013
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confirming the rule. Even this number is too small for more than 10-year-old operating system
and cannot be supported by any trend. The trend indicated by first two sources shows steady
hovering around 85% for Windows and 1.0% for Linux. Third graph shows slight decline of
Windows, but still fluctuating around 85%, while Linux failed to break 5% level and is quite
steady.
Data derived from http://www.netmarketshare.com/operating-system-market-
share.aspx?qprid=9&qpcustomb=0&Qptimeframe=M&qpsp=130&qpnp=25
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Figure 2-1. Desktop Top Operating Systems Market Share (on a logarithmic scale)
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Data derived from http://gs.statcounter.com/#os-ww-monthly-200807-201203
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Figure 2-3. Windows vs. Linux Worldwide (on a logarithmic scale)
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In summary, the market share estimated by web server statistics for Linux in the desktop OS
market ranges from less than 1% to 4.8%. In comparison, Microsoft operating systems
combined (Windows 7, Vista, and XP) hold more than 80%. Interesting is that the all-time peak
of Linux usage was registered in July 2011 (5.3%) and has since dropped to 4.9% (Jan 2012).
Windows 7 share has been growing steadily in the a.m. period from 39.1% in July 2011 to 47.1%
in Jan 2012.
We can conclusively say that the case can be considered as being over. The Linux distributions
have been around for about 10 years now and they failed to gain any significant market share,
hovering below 5% mark at the very optimistic estimations. Windows, on the other hand, has
managed to retain significant market share of more than 80% for the whole duration of the
case. The outcome, therefore is non-ambiguous, the entrant (Linux) failed to enter the market
of desktop OS and failed to disrupt the incumbent (Windows).
Windows OS has always been priced at the average level of $200 for the basic version. Below is
the table with summary of full pricing of different Windows editions (assumed no upgrade) for
the time horizon of our case study.
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Date Windows XP Windows Vista Windows 7
2004 Home edition:
$19926
Professional:
$2997
2007 Home Basic:
$188.90 - $228.96
Home Premium:
$217.98 - $267.5329
Ultimate:
$184.13 - $49.9930
2009 Home Premium:
$199.99
Professional:
$299.99
Ultimate:
$319.9931
Table 2-7. Official Prices of Windows OS
Linux distributions are free due to the nature of open-source copyright license (GNU General
Public license or GPL)32.
For the core component of the computer that allows running applications, OS is quite different
form a typical tangible product. Quality for OS is the ability to maintain functionality of a
computer without crashing. In addition, quality is the ease of use and maintenance. Given the
26 http://web.archive.org/web/20031002031945/
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/home/howtobuy/gricing.asg, Accessed 2013
27 http://web.archive.ora/web/20031204221225/
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/pro/howtobuv/pricingretail.asp Accessed 2013
28 http://web.archive.or/web/20070217180703/
http://www.windowsmarketplace.com/category.aspx?bcatid=1008&tabid=2 Accessed 2013
29 http://web.archive.org/web/20070227103229/
http://www.windowsmarketplace.com/category.aspx?bcatid=1010&tabid=2 Accessed 2013
30 http://web.archive.org/web/20070910121025/
http://www.windowsmarketplace.com/category.aspx?bcatid=1001&tabid=2 Accessed 2013
31http://web.archive.org/web/20091208101145/http://www.microsoft.com/Windows/buy/default.aspx?,
Accessed 2013
32 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU General Public License Accessed 2013
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inherent nature of the software releases schedule, there are always a lot of bugs that need to
be fixed in order to make sure the computer is running and is not compromised by hacking
attacks from the Internet. Patches are one of the most important features of the support and
maintenance period that ensure constant fixing of bugs. Hence, the process of checking for,
obtaining, and applying patches is the most important one for users. Not the actual number of
patches, but the ease and efficiency of patching process is the big differentiator. Microsoft used
an update model known as "Patch Tuesday"33 where patches and updates are issued usually on
the second Tuesday of a month unless there are critical updates that needs to be released
earlier. This model is different from various Linux update models.
Another factor that was actively discussed by users in the early days of Linux was the ability to
run on older hardware. Many were accusing Microsoft of pushing up the requirements for
hardware thus effectively forcing users to buy newer hardware if the wanted to use the latest
Windows OS.
Our market in this case is mostly inexperienced computer users (home, office desktops etc.).
They are very sensitive to network externalities, price, and quality, while being moderately
sensitive to innovations.
If we look at what incumbent has to offer to them, we notice that incumbent has
* Very high Network Externalities. Network externalities here are applications that are
working on OS. Tons of applications are written for Windows as opposed to very few
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patch Tuesday Accessed 2013
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applications for Linux, especially heavy 3D games and fancy photo and video editing
software, which is very important for this market segment.
0 Higher Quality. Quality here means ease of installation, ease of maintenance (upgrade,
technical support), and reliability. Windows is easier to install (and most of the time it
comes preinstalled on a new PC), it is easier to navigate (it has only one flavor as
opposed to command line interface or several GUI packages available for Linux), easier
to update (at least initially). All this translates into higher positive experience for
consumers, or quality of the product for this market.
On the other side, new entrant has
" Much higher Price attractiveness, as users have to buy Windows, while Linux is free
" Higher Innovation. New dimension of performance introduced by Linux is the ability to
create custom packages or distributions in order to be able to fine-tune them to specific
narrow tasks, optimized performance of the kernel, fewer bugs. Even though Windows
has different flavors that are supposed to be tuned to specific tasks and segments of
users as well, they are mostly used for marketing purposes to justify different price
levels.
Magnitude of the effect of features on the decision to buy follows AND logic, where both
sensitivity to a feature set and the feature itself (such as price, innovation, quality, or network
effect), have to be multiplied to identify the end effect on consumer behavior. Using this AND
logic, we can see that not all the superior features of the product are demanded by the
environment, example being innovation of Linux. This translates into higher influence on the
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decision to buy Windows, and as the result, the influence on the market share of the incumbent
is much higher than that of new entrant. The result of this case is clear disruption.
SERVER OPERATING SYSTEM
Now, let us see what the differences for Server Operating system case are. Market in the case
of Server OS case is mostly corporate IT admins. As opposed to home users, they are much less
sensitive to Price (companies are ready to pay for reliable IT solutions), hence we see that Linux
Price influence on the decision to buy is weaker now (remember AND logic).
Users care about quality as strongly as they did in desktop market. Quality here means ease of
maintenance (upgrade, technical support), and enormous amount of reliability and availability.
Linux has offered a way for this market to get Quality. Being an open source product with very
diverse and rich community Linux offers IT users the necessary level of quality by leveraging
innovative feature of Linux - ability to customize and fine-tune distributions. In addition, many
optimized distributions are offered by the community for major tasks such as Web-server, Data
centers etc. Hence, we have higher influence on the decision to buy from Quality.
This market has higher Innovation sensitivity due to the ability of users to leverage innovation
and better perform their jobs by creating custom packages or distributions, fine-tune them,
optimize, and achieve higher quality. Even though Windows has much better diversity in server
product line than in desktops, Linux has clear advantage here and we have strong influence on
the decision to buy.
We can see that these changes in customer preferences translate into higher influence on the
decision to buy for Linux in Server market than it was in Desktop market and as the result, the
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influence on the market share of Linux is stronger. Linux Server OS market share has shown
steady increase since 2007 from 19.6% to 26.3% forecast in 2013 3
Figure 2-6. Worldwide Server OS Installed Base. Source: IDC
The numbers vary as it is much more difficult to evaluate server market share for free
distributions of Linux, but even conservative reports from IDC show that Linux has about 25%
server OS market share, while windows has about 70%. Therefore, this is clear case of
coexistence and the result is different from desktop market solely due to the different
customer preferences.
34 Worldwide Client and Server Operating Environments 2012-2016 Forecast The Changing Dynamics and
Demographics, Al Gillen, Irs Feng, IDC, 2012
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Case Analysis
SERVER OS
Incumbents innovate,
restructure while maintaining
quality
DESKTOP OS
* Strong Network Effect of
Incumbent product
SERVER OS
* Consumers are willing to
tradeoff quality and innovation
DESKTOP OS
* Consumers value quality and
compatibility over innovation
and low price
* Consumers value innovation, but
incumbent's product has strong
network effect
Table 2-8. Desktop and Server Operating Systems Case Analysis
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MOBILE WORLD: ANDROID, APPLE, NOKIA, MOTOROLA
NOKIA VS. MOTOROLA (BASIC PHONES)
The mobile phones were first presented by Bell Labs in the middle of 20 1h century, on June 17,
1946 in St. Louis, Missouri, but early technology featured phones for cars, as they were heavy
and bulky, and required a lot of power. The network was capable of handling only few
simultaneous calls at that time and it was not until 1970s when the technology matured enough
to introduce working handheld device. Motorola and Bell Labs were racing with each other to
introduce handheld phone first, and on April 3, 1973 Motorola executive made first mobile
phone call from a handheld phone calling Bell Labs executive to declare the victory. The weight
of the device was 2.5 pounds and it was quite large with 9 x 5 x 1.75 inches dimensions. In
1983, Motorola had received the approval from FCC for the first commercial handheld phone.
At approximately the same time, Bell Labs introduced first commercial Advanced Mobile Phone
System (AMPS) mobile phone network. First generation networks in the US and Europe were
analog, but in 1990 new digital network, GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications), was
introduced in Europe and in 1991 the first digital phone call was made. Since that time, GSM
became ubiquitous standard in Europe supported by the governments and EU regulations.
However, in the US, unlike Europe, adoption of digital network was not imposed by government
and US market remained fragmented for a long time after GSM populated Europe and the
world.
Capitalizing on the first mover advantage, Motorola was the largest mobile phone
manufacturer with 60% of the US market share in 1994 and average revenue growth 27% a year
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between 1993 and 19953s. Motorola overall sales in 1994 increased 31% to $22.2bn with
Communication Segment reported 19% increase in sales to $5.8bn and orders rising at 7%.
At the same time, Nokia in 1990s was struggling with falling sales, and the company financial
results were far off since the demise of the Soviet Union (that was a significant source of trade
and revenue). Attempts to restructure the company failed to bring desired profitability and
Siemens saw Nokia as an attractive takeover target. Between 1984 and 1989, the average
annual growth of Nokia's common stock was just 1%. Basic industrial units of Nokia were sold.
However, the telecommunications, mobile phones, and data communications units were left as
pillars for recovery. By early 1990s, the company has found itself in the worst Finland's
recession since 1930s, due to the economic shift from the Cold War era to European
integration. In 1992, new CEO, Jorma Ollila, was appointed and Nokia made an important
strategic decision to focus on mobile communications (Steinbock, 2001).
In 1994, the US carriers began switching to digital technology, which promised many benefits
for consumers, such as Caller ID, messaging and better call quality, and Motorola, enjoying the
laurels of first mover and leader of the market, refused to follow the trend. Robert
Weisshappel, cell-phone chief of Motorola, believed that most consumers wanted better
analog phones, small and stylish, not the new digital phone that has to be bulky and ugly as the
technology was immature. He said, "forty three million analog customers can't be wrong" at
3s BusinessWeek. 05/04/98, Issue 3576, p140-148
36 Motorola Annual Report, 1994
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the executive meeting of cellular group37 , and in 1996 Motorola announced StarTAC, the ultra-
sleek analog phone. It had been in development for the last two years and cost millions of
dollars in R&D, and Motorola tried to recruit as many customers as possible by leveraging
switching cost thru wireless providers. Motorola decided to allow StarTAC sales only to those
carriers who had bought about 75% of their phones from Motorola and had a dedicated
promotion campaign for its phones. This infuriated many wireless carriers and turned out to be
complete failure as several of them refused to agree to these terms.
Another mistake that cost Motorola leading position was an attempt to develop its own digital
chip, competing with rival chip from Qualcomm. The development took two years, but was
unsuccessful and by the time the US wireless carriers were placing orders for digital phones,
Motorola had nothing to offer.
When Motorola management has decided to make digital phones, it was difficult due to
competing standards in the US. There were TDMA (promising three times the capacity of the
analog network), CDMA (offering six times the capacity), and GSM (two to three times the
capacity). Motorola had developed GSM phones first, and became big supplier to Europe and
GSM carriers in the US, but it failed to quickly manufacture phones for other two wireless
standards in the US. This and several other managerial mistakes including those when
engineering efforts were focused on one standard ignoring others, cost Motorola time and
market share, and are summarized in the Table 2-9.
3 BusinessWeek. 05/04/98, Issue 3576, p140-148
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BELL ATLANI
AMERITECH
U.S. CELLULA
RSONAL COMMUNICATIONS Equipment problems in 1997-98 resulted in
PrimeCo network shutting down between 30
min and up to two hours. PrimeCo identified
the problem is in Motorola's equipment, butt
Motorola could not fix the problem for several
months. PrimeCo dropped Motorola's
equipment and turned to Lucent.
IC In early 1996, the carrier asked both Lucent
and Motorola for equipment to help prevent
fraud. Lucent provided the technology within
three months. Motorola took a year and Bell
Atlantic still was not completely satisfied with
its product.
In 1995, Ameritech told Motorola that it
wanted to move to digital equipment. When
Ameritech launched its digital network in
Spring 1997, Motorola did not have products
ready. Ameritech turned to Qualcomm and
Sony.
R The carrier was forced to test four batches of
Motorola's digital wireless phones over a six-
month span before they finally worked.
Meanwhile, similar phones-all used in its
Tulsa (Okla.) market-have been supplied by
rival Nokia for two years.
Table 2-9. Summary of Motorola Issues. Source: BusinessWeek
These mistakes became apparent already by 1998, when the market share in the US slid to
30% 8. In 1997, the company's revenue growth slowed to 5% from 27% few years ago and
profits plummeted 33%39 with shareholders return about 1% in 1997 from 75% in 1993. By
1999, Motorola has lost the mobile phone war to Nokia and had to focus on other
communication markets.
38 Gartner Dataquest
39 BusinessWeek. 05/04/98, Issue 3576, p140-148
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ANDROID/APPLE VS. NOKIA/MOTOROLA (SMARTPHONES)
As much as Nokia has enjoyed its dominance after defeating Motorola in 1990s, it has made the
whole lot of mistakes in the US market. In early 2000s, Nokia was taken over by its archrival
Motorola before both ceded to new players such as Apple and Android.
Between 1998 and early 2000s, Nokia was a global leader of the world $100bn mobile market
with more than 30% market share. In the US, Motorola was defeated and Nokia enjoyed the
growth of the subscribers. However, in the early 2000s, market forces began to change and
Nokia had lost most of its momentum and market share. In Europe, where Nokia used to have a
46monopoly, the market share went from 51% in 2002 to 32.6% in 2004
The mistakes made by Nokia were in part similar to those that Motorola made just a decade
ago. First and most important mistake was almost completely identical - Nokia refused to
adjust its phones to the US customers' requirements and instead insisted on the features it had
for the phones worldwide. Just as Motorola refused to switch to digital phone, claiming it
would be bulky, Nokia refused to offer "clamshell" or flip phones, sticking to mono-block form
40 Nokia Mobile Phones Tops One Million in Unit Sales, 17 May 1993, Mobile Phone News Phillips Business
Information, Inc., Vol. 11, No. 19
41 Nokia knocks on U.S. door; Nordic cellphone maker moves swiftly into number-two market share spot,
10 February 1992, HFD-The Weekly Home Furnishings Newspaper
42 Nokia gains mobile market share - paper, 6 February 1996, Reuters News
43 BusinessWeek. 05/04/98, Issue 3576, p140-148
44 U.S. handset sales grow while revenues lag, 12 February 1996, Mobile Phone News
4s Gartner Dataquest
46 Has Nokia Lost It?, January 24, 2005, FORTUNE Magazine,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune archive/2005/01/24/8234055/, Accessed 2013
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factor to save manufacturing cost. "Nokia, at the height of its success, decided not to adapt its
phones for the U.S. market. That was a mistake," said Ari Hakkarainen, a Nokia business
development executive from 1999 to 2007. "They are still trying to recover from this."47 In
addition, Nokia refused to play by the rules of US wireless carriers, who wanted to control user
experience and branding. They wanted to put their logo on the phone and customize the
content. Nokia refused, mistakenly thinking that the situation is similar to Europe, where there
are few hundreds of independent providers and the completion is fierce. In contrast, there are
few carriers in the US, and Nokia underestimated the bargaining power. The major mistake was
also the overlook of CDMA technology that is used by Verizon and Sprint, which led to
automatic loss of half of the US subscribers. When eventually, Nokia decided to manufacture
CDMA phones, it fell to the same mistake as Motorola before. Unwilling to pay to Qualcomm
who was the monopolist on the market of CDMA chips, Nokia decided to manufacture the chips
in house. After few years, Nokia had formed a joint venture with Sanyo to manufacture chips
and had subcontracted the production of CDMA phones to Asia before finally admitting the
failure and signing the deal with Qualcomm in 2006.
The iPhone introduced in 2007, made Nokia phones even less attractive and clumsier in terms
of the interface. Since 2000s, accusations of patent infringing became increasingly more
frequent, and the case of Nokia vs. Apple (considered in details in Chapter 3) was one of the
4 Nokia Tries to Undo Blunders in U.S., October 18, 2009, The New York Times,
http://www.nvtimes.com/2009/10/19/technology/companies/19nokia.html Accessed 2013
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most interesting that took years and cost billions of dollars that could have been used for
innovation instead.
By 2011, Nokia had less than 5% of mobile phones market share in the U.S., and Motorola was
going down at mere 10% market share. At the same time, smartphones of Apple (about 20%
market share) and Samsung (more than 20% market share) enjoyed increasing consumer
preferences.
Figure 2-9. Company Shares in the US, Retail Volume. Source: Euromonitor
Both cases of disruption clearly show the influence of Firm factors as the main driver behind the
outcome. Mistakes by Motorola in first case were replicated by Nokia in the second case, and
led to the same outcome.
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Case Analysis
BASIC PHONES / SMARTPHONES
* Inability to reorient resources to
satisfy customer preferences
(including that of providers)
* Wrong focus on old technology
(quality) as opposed to innovation
* No network effect at play
* High Innovation and Quality
* Customers valued new features of
digital phones and smartphones more
than elegant look of older
technologies
Table 2-10. Mobile Phones Case Analysis
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DIGITAL Music
Based on interview with John Cate (TuneCore, eMusic)
The word "digital" in relation to content is oftentimes used to refer to different concepts.
Fundamentally, it is important to differentiate between actual digitalization of the music that
has been commercially introduced in 1982 when the CD became available, and MP3 files that
emerged as a phenomenon in the early 1990s, but did not become really popular until high
speed Internet had reached certain penetration of the market. Initially, MP3 was mostly used to
rip the content of a CD for a personal use on a digital player, but eventually the Internet file
sharing services such as Napster made the MP3 extremely popular and gave rise to the
completely new industry and the mode of content consumption. It is this latter version of the
word "digital" that will be used in this case. We are going to look at two players -TuneCore and
eMusic that were reshaping traditional music value chain with new disruptive product - digital
audio content.
At the same time as MP3 was gaining popularity, one of the first players who wanted to capture
the value from new product, was online music store eMusic established in 1998 by Bob Kohn
(legal affairs) and Gene Hoffman (Pretty Good Privacy, PGP). Initial piracy concerns and
implications were not clear and the company's decision was to ignore all the encryption, as
Gene Hoffman coming from the encryption company was sure that it could be broken anyway.
The model that was offered by eMusic was the only one available at that time, but that is quite
rare nowadays - download to own. Streaming was far away back then and the technology
limitations (bandwidth and traffic caps) were effectively making it useless. eMusic offered a
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number of subscription plans, including unlimited plan where users could download as many
tracks as they wanted for a flat monthly fee.
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The diagram above (Figure 2-10) shows the value chain in music production, distribution and
retail sales in a world of physical media, such as CDs. In this standard value chain, all the
content production was effectively aligned with physical steps necessary to get the content
delivered to a consumer. Each of the links was very well occupied and served by well-
established companies that were using the same business processes for years. The same value
chain was used for LPs, and CDs did not alter the value chain, as the properties of the product
remained the same - physical object with encoded music (analog encoding for LPs vs. digital
encoding for CDs).
When the digital distribution was introduced, it changed the picture significantly. Figure 2-11
shows new "shortcut" that was enabled by emerging properties of new digital content.
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Content Packaging, Distribution, and Retail were disrupted in the new digital value chain by
online stores, such as eMusic, iTunes, and later Amazon, Spotify, Rhapsody etc. The single step
that became important after content production was "download," which eliminated the need
for multiple players along old traditional value chain. As an additional "complementary" value,
new distribution mode allowed for better collection of consumption data and its further
analysis that was previously done by third party agencies based on surveys and indirect data.
Now, it became possible to get exact understanding of the consumption patterns of different
customer groups. In short, eMusic was a Value Chain innovation based on new digital Value
Chain architecture.
Popularity of MP3 and excessive demand for new innovative digital content spurred number of
alternative attempts to disrupt traditional value chain, with Napster being one of them. In a
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sense, this could be considered as a separate case, where eMusic would be an incumbent and
Napster an entrant disrupting it. However, in our opinion, Napster was an environmental
change (or change in the market preferences) that capitalized on consumer's sensitivity to
price. Napster dropped the price of the content to zero. Therefore, we believe Napster was not
an entrant in the traditional sense, but it promoted a new class of entrants by dramatically
reducing the cost of redistribution. Such redistribution of media was always possible with
photocopying (for print media), cassette/CD copying (for music and video), but distribution of
such activity was limited to physical contact. Napster overcame this limitation. Figure 2-12
shows how the content download was eliminated from the value capture by offering the
content at no cost.
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After Napster and other file sharing services started to threaten the revenue stream of artists
and labels, Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) attempted to fight Napster by
suing and taking down the service. As the result of number of litigations, Napster and similar
services were shut down. These and other similar actions led to a number of legislative
initiatives (such as Digital Millennium Copyright Act or DMCA) aimed at preventing piracy and
attempting to establish new ways to control the revenue stream in the new value chain. When
iTunes decided to recapture the value of digital content, it managed to revitalize customers
desire to pay by offering very convenient way of making a purchase from the mobile device,
and different price structure. Today, an interesting new trend emerges, which takes on the
content production domain, i.e. customers are taking on the Aggregation role by creating their
own personalized playlists and adjusting the stations to their habits, mood, and the time of the
day and activity (Pandora, Songza etc.). This can certainly be a beginning of new spiral of digital
value chain disruption that will be played against "old-fashioned" digital incumbents. Coupled
with cloud storage, it presents another dimension of innovation at the content production
level. Pandora, Spotify and Rhapsody are threatening another classical incumbent player --
radio stations, by offering various forms of streaming personalized content.
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As the digital format of music distribution and consumption became popular, artists began to
look at it as a promising distribution channel. The ease of reaching large audience of consumers
without costly promotional and marketing expenses was especially lucrative for young or
independent artists who were looking for ways to become known and potentially popular
among music enthusiasts and listeners. At the same time, large recording labels were slow at
adopting these new features of MP3 and consequently, little has changed in their value chain.
In this fertile environment, a new company called TuneCore was established by Peter Wells and
Gary Burke in 2005. Before TuneCore, independent artists did not have a chance to sell their
music to the majority of customers through popular retail channels. Distribution companies just
would not deal with them claiming that it is too much work for too little return. When
TuneCore was created in 2005, the company came up with the idea to have flat fee for an
album ($50) or a single ($9.99) per year for putting the songs on iTunes, Amazon, and other
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popular online stores. The service was available for any artist without requirements of
popularity or affiliation with large recording studio.
Large recording and distribution labels surprisingly did not really seem to be bothered with the
emergence of TuneCore and even started to sell some of the music through it. By 2008,
TuneCore became significant factor in online music distribution and in 2009, Universal Music
invested in it. Today, TuneCore represents about 10% of iTunes song and is behind about 4% of
all digital sales in the US48.
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4Out to Shake Up Music, Often With Sharp Words, May 6, 2012, The New York Times,
http://www.nvtimes.com/2012/05/07/business/tunecore-chief-shakes-up-music-with-his-own-
words.html?hp& r=0 Accessed 2013
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As opposed to eMusic, TuneCore was a business model innovation, not Value Chain innovation.
It used digital value chain to offer independent content creator the access to customers.
Case Analysis
Core Innovation - Digital Music Value Chain
* eMusic/TuneCore facilitated the
inclusion of long tail of content
production, and were welcomed by the
incumbents (e.g., Universal, itunes). As
a result, they did not invoke
competitive response from the
incumbent
* CDs had very weak
network externalities since
a user does not benefit
from other users having
CDs. This is why CDs were
easily disrupted by MP3
files
* Consumers highly price
sensitive and willing to
adopt innovations with low
quality and compatibility
* Consumers value availability over
quality/innovation, or are willing to
tradeoff quality and innovation
Table 2-11. MP3 vs. CD Case Analysis
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Entrants have far superior cost structure
.Napster introduced strong direct network effects, where
E jU one user's music collection became far more valuable to
other users
. Napster was an environmental change that created new
class of distributors, and dramatically dropped value of
traditional distribution channels (a critical
complementary asset for traditional content
incumbents). It exposed consumer's high price
sensitivity and low quality sensitivity that were always
present,, thus displacing many entrants until the next
value proposition was found by iTunes etc.
Table 2-12. Napster vs. Paid MP3 Case Analysis
Case Discussion
Both eMusic and TuneCore used new digital value chain to provide service to customers and
both were quite successful. In both cases, we can clearly observe technological disruption with
local equilibrium as of now with CDs and DVDs as music content media, with no industry
disruption potentially attributable to the availability of corporate resources and abilities to
strike good deals with content production.
Here it is important to elaborate on the concept of equilibrium. Inarguably, in the double helix
environment where all the advantages are temporary (Fine, 1999), the definition of equilibrium
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is largely dependent on the time horizon chosen for analysis. We can speak about equilibrium
when the case leads to customer segmentation (each segment with different sets of
preferences), but even seemingly stable equilibrium is still temporary, as new entrant might
still displace the incumbent by luring out the incumbent's customers to the other segment.
However, it is not direct competition per se, but more of a discovering and satisfying latent
needs and separating previously unified customers.
There are rarely cases, when innovation does not create such customer segmentation. When
the mechanical typewriters were substituted with electrical ones, they clearly offered better
user experience; however, one can argue that there were still customers who needed to use
them where there is no access to power, hence leaving some market share for the incumbents.
Another example is dot-matrix printers that rarely anyone uses now at home, but that are still
being used by some airlines to print tickets and other documents using carbon copy paper.
These examples illustrate the fact that there is always local equilibrium in the disruption or no
disruption scenario, but its duration depends on the actual customer preferences and the
magnitude of split introduced by new product or service features. Local equilibrium should not
be confused with actual co-existence when there is persistent customer segmentation of
customer preferences (such as business travelers and homemakers), which respond to different
product features.
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TELECOM PROVIDERS
Based on interview with Roberto Saracco (Telecom Italia)
All telecom providers are now facing disruption of their traditional business model that has
been based on offering services to the customer over the network. The competition forced
telecom providers to cut prices, while regulatory actions decreased roaming charges and forced
telecom companies to unbundle the loop (last mile) and make it available to other players, thus
destroying main competitive advantage - customer base. The main disruption in telecom
industry today is that the service has shifted from being offered by the network to being
delivered by third parties over the same network. This very interesting case reveals some
peculiar business dynamic. In addition to major financial losses occurring due to the loss of
traditional services that were offered by telecom companies (such as call forwarding, long-
distance calls, and multi-party conference calls) to various third party providers including Skype
et al., investments in new infrastructure with higher bandwidth and capacity offer less ROI than
ever. New innovative features such as video content delivery had failed to deliver financial
benefits. Telecom companies had initially planned to use broadband data channels to deliver
more paid services to the customers. However, it turned out that the services were not
appealing enough to win the majority of the market or compete with content owners, who can
sell their own content through data channels built by telecom companies.
On a closer observation, we can see that this case can be split into few separate cases. In case
of traditional telecom services, it is clear that telecom providers are being disrupted by new
entrants such as Skype and others. However, in case of complementary services (such as video
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distribution), telecom providers seem to be just another entrant on par with other companies
that are trying to disrupt traditional model of delivering services, such as TV and movies (more
on that in (Klym, 2013)).
Considering disruption of telecom services, we need to look at the traditional analog PSTN
Value Chain (Figure 2-15).
.Ocal Voice Cables Cables
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Distance switches
voice
Caller ID Satellites
Call
orwarding
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In this value chain, services were tightly coupled with the network that controlled the transport
and user experience. Later, when some digital equipment was introduced (Figure 2-16), nothing
really changed in the value chain (as in the first case of digital music, little has changed in the
value chain when the CDs were introduced instead of LPs).
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The picture was completely different when TCP/IP value chain started to become dominant. As
shown in Figure 2-17, the whole domain of services and customer experience disappeared
because of new communication principle offered by IP technology where interconnectivity
between various segments of the network was key design requirement. There is an opinion that
the shift of computing power to the edges of the network, or increasing power of the terminals
(user devices) that are now capable of offering services previously requiring tight integration
with the infrastructure, is largely responsible for diminishing returns of telecom providers.
While this is certainly true and we do observe significant increase in the intelligence and
computing power of the terminals, the mere improvement in the computing power would
hardly change the existing telecom value chain where services were tightly coupled with the
network. Sufficiently powerful computers were already on the market in the 1990s, but with
the absence of the Internet, they had to rely upon modems to convert digital signal to voice in
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order to transmit it over providers' proprietary networks and connect to other computers. The
online games emerged early, but with the absence of reliable connectivity offered by the
Internet, they could not get traction. When the Internet emerged, it uncoupled the service from
transport, and it became reasonable to further increase the power of terminals. The Internet
created different value chain and enabled the evolution of new services decoupled from
providers' networks.
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Case Analysis
Core Innovation - TCP/IP Providers Value Chain
" Rising costs from race to invest in
capacity
" Dropping value of the core resource
(infrastructure) due to complex issues
(regulation, competition)
Incumbent's reorienting
resources to over-the-top
services could commoditize
the infrastructure further
" Majority of traditional services are
offered by third parties for zero price
and it is difficult to compete with
Price equal to zero. This becomes
possible because the traffic is cheap
and advertisers see a lot of value
" Elimination of Network effect due to
interoperability (e.g. SkypeOut feature
that destroyed the network effect of
PSTN networks)
*The environment is characterized by
High sensitivity to Prices and
Innovation. At the same time, users
have Lower sensitivity to Quality
willing to cope with some loss of
quality if the innovation features are
offered
Table 2-13. Telecom Providers Case Analysis
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Case Discussion
With transport separating from service, the cost remains with the operators, but their revenues
are shared. Despite investing money each year to double the capacity of their Internet
channels, telecom providers sell less service and lose revenue and customers to third party
service providers. Telecom companies are requested to provide more and more transport
service and being distanced from offering complementary service to the customers with more
peer to peer (or direct) connections established between end users. The service range has
increased substantially and customers' needs evolved thanks to the Internet technologies.
Eventually, conventional telecom companies could become simple network providers enabling
other service companies to earn money from doing direct business with customers over the
network.
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WIRELESS VS. WIRELINE DATA
Based on interview with Tony Tauber (Comcast)
This case is looking at the potential disruption of wireline data services offered by cable
companies such as Comcast, by LTE technology offered by Verizon and other wireless
companies. For the data transmission, quality is high bandwidth and high reliability (in form of
low latency, low jitter) and innovation is mobility (or coverage). Well-established Wireline Data
value chain has been successfully beefing up quality by integrating various cable components
when the main value proposition (data transmission) has always been using cable (to the end
user device) owned by cable providers.
Broadband !Cables Cabes cable
Internet modems, Ds
Satellites
TcP/iP
switches
The data service offered by wireless carriers was always very slow and even though there was
substantial push from the third parties offering various services on the go and also strong pull
from certain segments of customers, such as business travelers and others valuing just-in-time
information, the adoption had never been high up until the LTE technology emerged.
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Figure 2-19 shows how the theoretical speed has changed in the last 20 years from very slow
2G networks to the latest LTE evolution that threatens to disrupt traditional cable services.
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Since the introduction of wireless voice communication, wireless data was always a
complementary feature, although with a very limited use due to the lack of quality. The
Wireless Data value chain (Figure 2-20) looks very similar to the Wireline Data value chain with
local loop displaced by cell towers and consumer cable modems by end user devices such as
tablets etc.
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For many years, cable companies could safely ignore wireless service as the competitor, as the
speed effectively prohibited the adoption of the technology. However, with the evolution of
data speed and commercial introduction of LTE in about 2011, it became increasingly clear that
wireline telecom providers have to consider wireless data if not as a serious threat, then at
least as a strong competitor especially in some markets where the cable penetration is not very
high.
In response, cable companies are starting to introduce mobility features to remain competitive.
This brings interesting dynamic of cable companies illustrating incumbent's product innovation.
As an example, Comcast has recently introduced public Wi-Fi coverage for some customers. In
the value chain, Wi-Fi hotspots are directly competing with cell towers as a local loop
alternative (Figure 2-21).
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)
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Case Analysis
Core Innovation - Wireless Data Value Chain
* The start of LTE constitutes
the improvement in quality
by new entrant - something
that model suggests as
"reorientation of resources
to quality," necessary step
for entrant to defeat the
incumbent
* Entrant's product has
certainly evolved its quality
* Switching costs from
incumbent are very weak,
consisting primarily of the
email accounts associated
with cable subscription.
However, with more and
more people switching their
email over to Google or
Yahoo, switching costs went
to very low amount,
consisting mainly of
contractual obligations
eThe Wi-Fi hotspots represent a
competitive response from the incumbent
in form of "reorientation of resources to
innovation"
* Initial deficiency of quality in new entrant's
product (low bandwidth) with very
distinctive innovative feature - mobility. If
the wireless product would be able to
increase quality and make it comparable, it
would be clear case of disruption.
However, there is technological limit to
increasing quality of wireless service in
terms of capacity
* Quality and Reliability of incumbent's
product has increased about 10 times
slncumbent product has not changed the
price: ($40-$50 per month for broadband
for the last 12-13 years) while entrant's
price has increased substantially
* Customers are not very sensitive to
Network Effect, but are very fragmented in
other three dimensions of Price, Quality,
and Innovation and cannot be easily
identifiable
Table 2-14. Wireless vs. Wireline Data Case Analysis
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Case Discussion
The network effect in this case is weak and is present on the new entrant side in an indirect
form as user apps using high-speed data connection on mobile devices. Further analysis shows
that users are very fragmented in the dimensions of price, quality, and innovation and cannot
be easily identifiable. There is constant process of tradeoffs that customers have to make in
order to represent their usage patterns. We suggest considering customer sensitivities in form
of a rhombus using Price, Quality, Innovation, and Network Effect as the vertices whose
distance from the center indicates strength of the sensitivity.
Figure 2-22. Customer Preferences
Consequently, customers can be divided in several macro groups that reflect major usage
patterns. Hard core gamers, for example, would be less concerned with Price and Innovation
(mobility), but more with Quality (speed and reliability). Business travelers would be more
responsive to Innovation (mobility) ignoring Price and Quality (speed and reliability) to a major
extent. In other words, the whole palette of possible combinations can be divided in areas
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capturing characteristic behavior of certain groups of users. Diagram below (Figure 2-23)
illustrates possible patterns behavior using empirical observations.
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This ongoing case will keep unfolding for substantial amount of time, as the entrant has just
started to offer good speed and capacity. However, capacity is very limited for wireless service.
In the end, this could be a case of co-existence, as some of the customers would still need to
use cables for most of their data consumption (i.e. given the adoption rate of online video
content).
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Chapter 3. IP PROTECTION COMPARISON IN DIFFERENT CLOCKSPEED
MARKETS
IP protection in general is a unique feature of the law landscape that aims at incentivizing
innovations and keeping people and companies motivated to invest in new technologies,
processes, and business models. The core idea of IP protection is to give companies strong
incentive to invest in maturing a new technology, but also (and probably even in the first place)
to ensure the technological progress of the society. If one company invents something, it enjoys
protection for a certain amount of time, after which the invention enters public domain where
others are free to use it. The length of this protection is from 20 (14 for design patents) to 70+
years depending on whether it is a patent or copyright protection. Generally, it works very well.
People and corporations enjoy protection granted by the society in return for either disclosing
their innovations (patents) or just publishing the forms or expressions (copyright). However, we
will argue that these tools were very handy and applicable in the old type of industries that
usually were quite slow and where inventions happened not very often and time to market was
very long. In other words, copyright protection works very well in the slow clockspeed
industries (or the industries that evolve at slow rate as defined by Charles Fine (Fine, 1999))
such as aircraft, automotive, semiconductors.
In slow clockspeed market, users benefit from copyright or patent law in terms of both quality
and innovation. Incumbent firms enjoy long period of sustainable demand while entrant firms
are trying to invent completely new technology as current one is protected and can only be
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either bought or licensed. Current players compete for customers by increasing quality of the
product. Disruptive innovations occur when new company brings in new technology that is
appealing to certain portion of customers, who value innovation more than quality. In such
scenario, users are free to choose between old product that has a lot of quality and new
product that has new features that might still be not really perfected. Majority of users are able
to choose either old product and enjoy it for a long time, or innovative products that are
offered by new companies at slow pace. The market share is defined by user preferences and
their sensitivity to quality and innovation. If there were no copyright protection in this market,
companies would have no incentives to innovate as they could as well just copy existing
technology. New entrants would be eaten by large corporations who would immediately
imitate their innovations as soon as they see a potential. Moreover, firms would be fiercely
fighting to win the market share and do not have time to innovate at all. Here the length of the
protection offered by the society is synchronized with the clockspeed of the market.
In fast clockspeed industry, where companies, products, and processes evolve very fast, the
picture is quite different and IP protection becomes an inhibitor of both quality and innovation.
70+ or even 14 years of protection is quite lengthy period for fast clockspeed industries. The
technology changes rapidly, and companies tend to introduce new features as soon as possible,
patenting everything and using patents to exploit general inefficiencies of the copyright
legislation and vagaries of the patent claims to pursue injunctions against other companies by
claiming the rights to the pieces of technology that are crucial for customers to have full and
complete experience. The fear of economic consequences of any litigation (that is about $5MM
on the average) threatens any small to mid-size company, and forces it to use resources to find
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workarounds about patents or copyrights, and thus effectively limits the innovations that would
improve the final product. In other words, IP protection creates huge redundancy in fast
clockspeed markets when multiple companies are effectively trying to invent the bicycle to
circumvent patents of other companies. It also leads to the dilution of quality, as companies are
forced to keep reducing time to market sacrificing quality of the product and sticking to "good
enough" concept that is very vaguely defined.
We do not blame the IP protection per se. It is necessary and always worked and still works in
slow clockspeed industries. However, fast clockspeed industries suffer from the length of the
protection offered by law that was created for slow clockspeed markets. In fast clockspeed
market, if there were no IP protection or it was more agile (i.e. offering less protection time),
the companies would be able to use older inventions (with no or expired protection) and
complement them with own innovations delivering much better and richer product and
improving overall user experience. These fast iterations could go back and forth allowing
companies to improve their own products based on work of others. Open source movement
clearly demonstrates the viability of this approach in super-fast clockspeed software market. Of
course, the most criticism goes around the fact that companies are afraid of not being
compensated enough for innovating and improving. However, the business model could be
developed around the idea of customizations of the product or improving specific product
features depending on the particular market segment by developing core competency and
effectively becoming renowned authority. This model has been successfully used by many
companies working with open source software.
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SPECIFICS OF MOBILE MARKET LITIGATIONS
Of course, mobile business, being very fast clockspeed industry where scale of technology
changes is incredible, reveals very interesting dynamics in response to existing IP protection.
Copyright litigations in the mobile business turned into fierce battles over who is controlling the
customers. Since it became so obvious that as soon as a cool feature is introduced in the mobile
space, it has potential to change the whole landscape of the business, incumbent companies
are trying to sue the entrants for infringing some of their patents. Because of the substantial
length of the protection, new entrants might do infringe some of the older patents, or at least
there might be a reason to file a lawsuit, which would be impossible to fund for any entrant let
alone if there are several lawsuits filed. As a result, new entrants are either bought or expelled
from the market while larger incumbents are preoccupied defending their fences, and the
clockspeed of innovations and the industry slows down.
The partial reason why this became such a widespread practice in the mobile market over the
last couple of years is that mobile phones and tablets for that matter have become a new hot
market shifters that managed to displace basic phones almost completely and now threaten to
significantly reduce desktop PC market. Of course, PC will be there for many other applications,
but even the best stronghold of desktop PCs is now under fire as some companies are
beginning to consider buying tablets instead of PCs49. As these two markets merge to
49 As PCs Wane, Companies Look to Tablets, August 19, 2011, The New York Times, Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/2O/technology/as-pcs-wane-companies-look-to-tablets.html?pagewanted=all,
Accessed 2013
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smartphones/tablets market that is so lucrative for newcomers and incumbents, consumers
start to feel waves of court decisions erupting from hot litigation volcano virtually every day.
Here and there, injunctions are issued by the courts and the products are either blocked from
import or removed from the stores in different parts of the worlds" s.
Who's suing who in the mobile business (8 Oct 2010 11.20)
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so Motorola wins iCloud injunction; iPhone, iPad temporarily pulled from online store, February 3, 2012, ZDNet,
Available at: http://www.zdnet.com/blog/london/motorola-wins-icloud-iniunction-iphone-ipad-temporarily-
pulled-from-online-store/2856, Accessed 2013
sl Who Are The Real Losers In Patent Lawsuits?, August 31, 2011, InformationWeek, Available at:
http://www.informationweek.com/news/mobility/business/231600529 Accessed 2013
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Kodak
The mobile market is full of clashes surrounding main players - Android and iOS. Mind-boggling
infographics below illustrates snapshots of the litigations in the mobile space, Figure 3-152,
Figure 3-2s , Figure 3-3s4, Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-555.
Apple has de facto become a center for the lawsuits as they have been trying to drive many
products off the market and many companies replied with counter litigations. Role of Apple
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could be even more substantial if the fact that Apple has sold its patents to NPE (non-practicing
entity or "patent troll") Digitude Innovations56 would be proven. This company has filed several
suits with International Trade Commission alleging patent infringements by RIM, HTC, LG,
Motorola, Samsung, Sony, Amazon, and Nokia. If these claims are confirmed, it can seriously
affect the sales of the products of the a.m. companies on different markets. The only defense
for many companies involved in litigations is to countersue the plaintiffs attempting to threaten
their own products. However, NPEs do not manufacture anything, so it is impossible to defend
against them by countersuing. The only settlement they accept is money or injunction.
The two charts in Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-4 show astonishing dynamic of litigations documented
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by Verizon. First chart is from August 2011, while second is updated in January 2012.
It is obvious that mere half of the year separating these versions has entangled the situation
tremendously. New players have been added to the scene and new suits and countersuits have
been filed by major players. Apparent complexity of the chart shows that main losers here are
not the companies who lost the suits, but users who lost companies' focus. It is very popular for
companies to claim that their focus is customer satisfaction. However, companies have only
finite resources, and each litigation costs tens of millions of dollars to settle even it would be
won. If the litigation is lost, then new spree of spending either for royalties or for countersuing
is released. As a result, the product is suffering from lack of innovation, quality, or performance.
The charts show that customers are not the focus of companies when defining the business
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strategy, or at least not the only one. Litigations became centerpiece of the market strategy
where technology is being pushed from the role of satisfying customer needs by improved
performance or quality to a much less prestigious role of being mere servant of lawyers in the
attempts to squeeze out royalties or destroy another company.
The acquisitions for many companies are now aimed not at improving competitive advantage
on the market by acquiring new technology, but rather at improving patent portfolio to
increase armor and stamina in litigation battles. The chart on Figure 3-5 shows how many
patents are held by each of the main players in mobile space. One interesting fact from this
chart can be derived about recent acquisition of Motorola by Google. It is obvious, that given all
the facts about litigations and the countermeasures in form of counter suing, Google has very
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small defense power having only 1760 patents. Motorola, on the other hand, has more than
17500 patents and 7500 applications. Expanding portfolio of patents would certainly give
Google substantial boost in its counter suing capability.
These facts clearly demonstrate how the companies are adopting obsolete IP protection system
to the new fast clockspeed market and using it to maximize their profits not by utilizing their
core competency and perfecting it by collaborating with other players, but by employing
questionable practice of slowing down the clockspeed of the industry through litigations and
squeezing out the competitors. Although it might seem appropriate for the single business
entity that cares about maximizing its revenue, it should be treated as unacceptable as cartel
agreements from the perspective of the regulators.
APPLE Vs. NOKIA CASE STUDY
The above-mentioned dynamics of litigating is well illustrated by the case of Apple vs. Nokia.
Two leading mobile phones companies at the time fought about portfolio of patents that were
allegedly infringed by both parties.
Step 1
The case started by Nokia that sued Apple on 10/22/2009 in United States District Court in
Delaware claiming the infringement on 10 patents related to GSM, UMTS.(3G) and Wi-Fi (IEEE
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802.11) technologies57. The patents in questions were U.S. Patent Nos. 5,802,465, 5,862,178,
5,946,651, 6,359,904, 6,694,135, 6,775,548, 6,882,727, 7,009,940, 7,092,672, and 7,403,621.
Nokia mentioned that prior to filing the suit it had licensed its technologies to 40 other
companies while Apple refused to negotiate the appropriate license fee58 . Actual Nokia
complaint5 9 cites Nokia's argument to license its patents under FRAND terms (i.e. fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory). These patents were obtained by Nokia while working on
the GSM, UMTS, and Wi-Fi standards and, since they are necessary for any company to use any
of these three technologies and since iPhone uses all of them, Apple should pay for licensing
the patents.
This is Nokia's side of the story. However, in order to understand if this claim is substantial
enough, in other words, if the patents are essential for the GSM, UMTS, and Wi-Fi technologies,
it is necessary to evaluate them. The GSM and UMTS standards have been developed by the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and Wi-Fi was created under IEEE.
Under the terms of the standard development procedure, all members have to disclose if they
have the patents that are essential for the new standard. However, there is no verification
process if the patents claimed by a company are really "must have" for the implementation.
The drawback is that every company is trying to claim that it has essential patents hoping to get
royalty payments from anyone who wants to use the standard. Research firm called Fairfield
s7 In Lawsuit, Nokia Says iPhone Infringes Its Patents, October 22, 2009 , The New York Times, Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/23/technology/companies/23nokia.html Accessed 2013
58 Nokia sues Apple, says iPhone infringes ten patents, October 22, 2009, Engadget,
http://www.engadget.com/2009/1022/nokia-sues-appe-says-iphone-infringes-ten-patents/ Accessed 2013
59 Available at: http://podcasts.aolcdn.com/engadget/files/21458614-Nokia-vs-Apple-Complaint.pdf Accessed
2013
100
Resource Internationa 60 has evaluated all of the patents for GSM standards and found that
Nokia does indeed hold a majority of these patents, Figure 3-6. The independent expert
judgments are consistent for UMTS and Wi-Fi as well.
The potential implications for Nokia might have been enormous. The wholesale price of iPhone
to carriers was $600 and even 2% royalty would be $12 per each phone sold. With 34 million
iPhones sold as of the date of the filing of the suit, it would represent about $.4bn. Nokia
claimed it has invested more than $60bn over the last 20 years in the development of GSM and
UMTS technologies.
Patent Families Judged as Essential to
GSM Standards (158)
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6 Analysis of Patents Declared as Essential to GSM as of June 6, 2007, December 31, 2007, Fairfield Resources
International, Available at: http://frlicense.com/GSM FINAL.pdf Accessed 2013
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Step 2
On 12/11/2009, Apple countersued Nokia in United States District Court in Delaware. Apple
denied the infringement on all the patents and claimed that Nokia attempted to copy the
iPhone and infringed 13 patents of Apple. The infringing Nokia models were S60, E71 and 5310.
Apple asked for a dismissal of Nokia's complaint and wanted Nokia to pay damages for
infringements. Patents in questions were 6 5,634,074, 6,343,263, 5,915,131, 5,555,369,
6,239,795, 5,315,703, 6,189,034, 7,469,381, RE 39,486, 5,455,854, 7,383,453, 5,848,105, and
5,379,431.
The counterclaim text6 2 accuses Nokia of seeking "to gain an unjust competitive advantage over
Apple by charging unwarranted fees to use patents that allegedly cover industry compatibility
standards and by seeking to obtain access to Apple's intellectual property." It also claims,
"Nokia needs access to Apple's intellectual property because Nokia has copied and is now using
that patented technology."
Step 3
On 12/29/2009, Nokia filed infringement complaint with International Trade Commission (ITC)"
claiming Apple is infringing on seven Nokia patents involving iPhone, computers, and iPods. The
patents in questions include United States Patents 6,834,181, 6,895,256, 6,518,957, 6,073,036,
6 Apple Countersues Nokia for Copying iPhone (Plus Disputed Patents and Full Text of Counterclaim), December
11, 2009, AllThingsD, Available at: http://allthingsd.com/20091211/apple-countersues-nokia/ Accessed 2013
62 Available at: http://i.i.com.com/cnwk.ld/i/ne/pdfs/AAPL NOKCountersuit.pdf, Accessed 2013
6 Letter to Marilyn R, Abbott, Secretary, USITC, December 29,2009,
http://stadium.weblogsinc.com/engadget/files/nokia apple itc.pdf Accessed 2013
102
6,262,735, 6,924,789, 6,714,091 and covered user interface (touch screen), camera, antenna,
and power management technologies. Paul Melin, General Manager of patent licensing at
Nokia said,64 "Nokia has been the leading developer of many key technologies in small
electronic devices. This action is about protecting the results of such pioneering development.
While our litigation in Delaware is about Apple's attempt to free-ride on the back of Nokia
investment in wireless standards, the ITC case filed today is about Apple's practice of building
its business on Nokia's proprietary innovation." Nokia claimed that iPhone infringes on the
patents that cover a "programmable voltage controlled oscillator," a way to combine speaker
and antenna assemblies, a contextual linking of data from an "electronic message" that causes
another app to open in order to handle that data (clicking a phone number in an e-mail to make
a call). Nokia also claimed that the click-wheel on most iPods violates a patent on combining
multiple inputs in one interface and that every Apple device with a built-in camera (including
the MacBook) violates a patent on combining camera functions into a single chip65. Nokia asked
the ITC to ban imports of Apple mobile products such as MacBook, iPhone and iPod.
6 Nokia files ITC complaint against Apple over patents, December 29, 2009, MarketWatch, Available at:
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2009-12-29/industries/30682796 1 nokia-corp-itc-complaint-apple Accessed
2013
65 Nokia adds additional lawsuit in patent catfight with Apple, January 4, 2010, ArsTechnica, Available at:
http:/Iarstechnica.com/apple/ news/2010/-01/nokia-adds-additional-lawsuit-in-patent-catfight-with-a pple. ars,
Accessed 2013
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Step 4
On 1/15/2010, Apple responded to Nokia by filing counter complaint with ITC66 asking to block
Nokia phones from entering the U.S. market. Apple claimed Nokia products infringed nine of its
patents. Four of them were included in the initial filing with Delaware court in 2009, and five
new were added: 5,455,599, 5,519,867, 5,920,726, 5,969,705, and 6,424,354.
Step 5
On 2/19/2010, Apple drops four patents that were included in ITC filing from its original claim in
Delaware.
Step 6
On 2/24/2010, Apple files second lawsuit in Delaware confirming Nokia's infringement on nine
patents, including four that were dropped five days earlier thus bringing this lawsuit in
accordance to its ITC claim.
Step 7
On 3/3/2010, a federal judge in Delaware put two patent-infringement claims between Nokia
and Apple on hold while the U.S. International Trade Commission tries to resolve the dispute.
66 Letter to Marilyn R, Abbott, Secretary, USITC, January 15, 2010, Available at:
http://info.usitc.gov/sec/dockets.nsf/9398c3Oa938aa5ad85256fl9OO779Oc3/0 cac~bO94e8l2852852576acOO75ce9
b, Accessed 2013
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Step 8
On 4/9/2010, court in Delaware splits the main case into three trials, which will begin in 2012.
Step 9
On 5/7/2010, Nokia filed a lawsuit against Apple filed in the Federal District Court in the
Western District of Wisconsin arguing that iPhone and iPad infringe on five Nokia patents
6,317,083, 6,348,894, 6,373,345, 6,603,431, and 7,558,696. In a statement, Nokia mentioned,
"The patents in question relate to technologies for enhanced speech and data transmission,
using positioning data in applications and innovations in antenna configurations that improve
performance and save space, allowing smaller and more compact devices. These patented
innovations are important to Nokia's success as they allow improved product performance and
design."67
Step 10
On 6/28/2010, Apple files counterclaim in the Federal District Court in the Western District of
Wisconsin claiming infringement of seven patents 5,946,647, 5,612,719, 7,710,290, 7,380,116,
7,054,981, 5,379,430, and 7,355,905.
67 Nokia expands patent-infringement feud with Apple, May 7, 2010, FierceWireless, Available at:
http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/nokia-expands-patent-infringement-fued-apple/2010-05-07 Accessed 2013
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Step 11
On 7/21/2010, Nokia drops its 6,262,735 patent about link functions and applications on a mobile
phone from ITC case.
Step 12
On 8/16/2010, Apple amends its counterclaim in Wisconsin and replaces patent 7,355,905 with
the new one 5,946,647 that was granted three weeks before.
Step 13
On 9/17/2010, Nokia amends its claim in Wisconsin and adds two more patents 7,532,680 and
5,752,172 to the original 5 patents.
Step 14
On 9/27/2010, Apple files a lawsuit in London claiming infringement on nine UK patents and a
lawsuit in Dusseldorf, Germany claiming infringement on nine German patents, the same
European patents as in UK suit.
6 United States International Trade Commission Order No. 23, July 21, 2010, Available at:
www.itc337update.com/uploads/file/PDF 072110-1[11.pdf Accessed 2013
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Step 15
On 9/30/2010, Nokia files counterclaim in Dusseldorf, Germany over infringement of four
German patents. On 10/12/2010, Nokia adds 3 more patents to Dusseldorf case. On
10/25/2010, Nokia adds 5 more patents in a new lawsuit in Mannheim, Germany.
Step 16
On 10/28/2010, Apple drops three patents 5,519,867, 5,929,852, and 5,915,131 from its ITC
claim.
Step 17
On 12/3/2010, Nokia makes counterclaim in London over four UK patents. Apple countersues
Nokia in Mannheim, Germany over one patent and two utility models (i.e. fast track patent with
less rigorous examination). Nokia Also files a lawsuit in The Hague, Netherlands over two
patents infringements.
Step 18
On 12/6/2010, Nokia drops patent 6,073,036 from its ITC claim.
Step 19
On 12/15/2010, Nokia questions the validity of Apple patents in Dusseldorf case in Federal
Patent Court of Germany. On 12/22/2010, Apple questions the validity of Nokia patents in
Dusseldorf case in Federal Patent Court of Germany.
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Step 20
On 1/6/2011, Wisconsin cases are transferred to Delaware.
Step 21
On 1/18/2011, Apple files to invalidate one Nokia patent in London case.
Step 22
On 2/22/2011, Apple drops patent 5,969,705 from its ITC case.
Step 23
On 3/25/2011, Administrative Law Judge makes a final decision and finds Apple as not
infringing any of Nokia's five patents.
Step 24
On 3/28/2011, Nokia files second ITC claim over seven patents 7,209,911, 6,212,529, 6,141,664,
7,558,696, 6,445,932, 5,898,740, and 7,319,874. Six of these patents (all seven except
7,558,696) are used to file a new lawsuit in Delaware court.
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Final layout of all the patents filed in Apple vs. Nokia clash is depicted below by the infographics
from Florian Mueller at FOSS Patents69 .
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Step 25
On 6/14/2011, Nokia and Apple settle their litigations. The financial structure of the agreement
consists of a one-time payment payable by Apple and on-going royalties to be paid by Apple to
Nokia for the term of the agreement. The specific terms of the contract are confidential.70 71
The settlement ended the litigations at ITC, Delaware, Wisconsin, Germany, UK, and
69 http://www.fosspatents.com
70 Nokia enters into patent license agreement with Apple, June 14, 2011, Nokia, Available at:
http://press.nokia.com/2011/06/14/nokia-enters-into-patent-license-agreement-with-apple/ Accessed 2013
Nokia Wins Apple Patent-License Deal Cash, Settles Lawsuits, Jun 14, 2011, Bloomberg, Available at:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news2011-06-14/nokia-apple-payments-to-nokia-settle-all-litigation.htmi Accessed
2013
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Netherlands. Stephen Elop, president and chief executive officer of Nokia said, "We are very
pleased to have Apple join the growing number of Nokia licensees. This settlement
demonstrates Nokia's industry leading patent portfolio and enables us to focus on further
licensing opportunities in the mobile communications market." Apple stated, "Apple and Nokia
have agreed to drop all of our current lawsuits and enter into a license covering some of each
other's patents, but not the majority of the innovation that makes the iPhone unique. We are
glad to put this behind us and get back to focusing on our respective businesses." Analysts have
agreed that while the settlement should have little financial impact on Apple, it includes
substantial payment to Nokia at the same time strengthening its negotiating position for
further licensing agreements from other companies who might have refused them before.
This case is one among thousands of cases happening in the mobile market and other fast
clockspeed industries where companies are clearly wasting tons of resources struggling with
the IP protection system adjusted to slow clockspeed markets. While every public company
strives to maximize its profits, litigations around IP certainly divert companies' focus and
resources from their core business to jeopardy of litigations. However effective it might seem
for some of the dinosaurs of business, it puts small to medium size companies out of play if
they cannot afford to litigate around patents portfolios accumulated by their larger
competitors. This effectively eliminates free competition and undermines the spirit of
entrepreneurship underpinning the founding principles of U.S. economy. It is obvious that old
72 Nokia Settles 2-Year Fight with Apple on Patents, June 14, 2011, The New York Times, Available at:
http://www.nvtimes.com/2011/06/15/technology/15nokia.html? r=2, Accessed 2013.
110
single dimension IP protection cannot be universally applied for all industries. Regulatory
actions are necessary to adjust IP protection system and synchronize it with the clockspeed of
different markets to ensure effective competition among players of all sizes and stimulate
inventions and innovations that benefit the society.
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Chapter 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have shown how application of Incumbent's Dilemma framework to different case studies
allows for better understanding of the innovation adoption dynamics, considering three distinct
factors
" product level features (price, quality, innovations, and switching costs)
" firm level features (resources to innovation vs. resources to quality, modularity etc.)
" environment features (sensitivity to innovation, quality, price, and network
externalities)
In cases of Linux vs. Windows, we have seen different environment factors responsible for no
disruption outcome in the desktop OS market, while commanding co-existence in the server OS
market. In basic phones vs. smartphones cases we have shown how similar dynamic behavior
of firms failing to offer features of product demanded by the market, was responsible for
displacing first Motorola, and later, previous winner Nokia. In digital music and telecom
provider cases, we could observe how consumers' high sensitivity to price resulted in clear
disruption of the value chain of traditional players. Wireless vs. wireline data case revealed very
interesting direction for future work, articulating possibility of change of the outcome due to
customer segmentation. This potential case of co-existence relates to earlier discussion about
local equilibrium vs. true customer segmentation. As this case moves along, it might provide
additional data that could be used to expand the framework.
When dealing with an empirical case that had happened in the past and where there are no
questions about the outcome the only challenge for a researcher is to find credible source of
information in order to be able to parameterize it and feed the data into the model. Although
there are challenges associated with this process as well, the general structure of the research
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is clear and straightforward. For example, in Windows vs. Linux case in server and desktop
markets, the outcomes are obvious (in server market there is a coexistence of both players,
while in desktop market Windows has won) and the supporting data is quite abundant. The
product or service as well as players themselves are easy to define and separate.
When switching over to ongoing cases, the challenges are much greater. Sometimes, large
incumbent companies are entering new markets, but they claim themselves as incumbents
when asked to describe the case. In other situations, it is hard to define what the product in
question is, i.e. a company might be looking at overall business performance of the enterprise
that is a function of multiple services and products and attempt to analyze its overall corporate
strategy as one case. This is especially true for large corporations that have huge variety of
products and/or services oftentimes interdependent, but still separate from each other. In
addition, sometimes a new product or service attempts to displace multiple products or
services from the perspective of customers. Therefore, even if the company is the same, there
might be several cases because the competing product/service is different.
These challenges are not very obvious for most managers responsible for making strategic
decisions. Without a framework in mind, the above-mentioned issues are piled up in a big
intertwined problem, which has very little structure and is almost impossible to analyze. Even
when informed about the Incumbent's Dilemma framework, managers tend to struggle
answering structured questions, as the information they have is not related directly to the
framework structure and careful consideration of all the underlying dynamics and factors is
needed in order to shape the case that is possible to analyze.
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If the data or the assumptions about the missing data are correct, the framework should be
instrumental in predicting the likelihood of a winning for either new entrant or incumbent. The
tricky part is consistency of customers' expectations and needs. Oftentimes, companies'
activities might change the set of customer preferences and overall user experience. Our
current version of the framework does not work with such situations and we have to make sure
that case parameters (i.e. set of consumer sensitivities) remain unchanged; otherwise a new
case needs to be defined and analyzed. Making consumer sensitivities endogenous, i.e.
dependent on other variables, is a major extension of the current framework and we will have
to approach it in our future work.
Three CFP cases also taught us few important lessons about the applicability of theoretical
framework to the analysis of real time cases. The main challenges here are to identify whether
the company is an incumbent or an entrant, accurately describe what is the product or service,
and what is the quality and innovation in the case. The most difficult questions for our
interviewees were those that asked about firm dealing with its resources.
Responses of the CFP members helped us refine the survey, addressing the most challenging
issues when answering the questions. As a result, we have split the survey in two parts (basic,
and detailed), we have also organized it differently to help readers better understand and
convey the core drivers of dynamics of the case. The data from this study will be used to
perform deeper empirical investigation aimed at more quantitative evaluation of lessons from
our model.
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Further dimension that can be considered in the future research is differentiation between
Platform and Product. Platform is defined when a technology has a set of features or functions
that can be used by other firms thus creating stronger (indirect) network effect. Multiple firms
are working on the same platform help to promote market share. At the same time, while we
do have Modularity as a firm factor in our current framework, we assume that it is reflected in
the product as well. More modularity means more parts of the product are produced outside of
the firm. Combining these two parameters, we can get better understanding of the outcome of
a clash. We hypothesize that when there is no platform (we have pure product), firms with
higher modularity have more chances to win, whereas when a platform exists (in form of API or
open architecture) the influence of Modularity diminishes. This remains to be answered in the
future work, which should take into account this and other relevant attributes to expand the
scope of the framework and improve its robustness and applicability.
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APPENDIX A. THE INCUMBENT'S DILEMMA: CASE STUDY SURVEY
The purpose of this survey is to help CFP members describe their experiences with disruption.
By providing a set of simple questions, we aim to capture and understand the main drivers of
the case and identify the underlying dynamics. If you are not sure of the answer to a particular
question, please give your best estimation.
The survey is divided into 2 parts: Part I is a short set of general questions that can be answered
fairly quickly. Part 2 is a longer set of detailed questions for those who have time to dig deeper
into the case. We are happy to provide assistance with Part 2.
We suggest you work in "DRAFT" view mode when filling this out.
YOUR NAME AND CONTACT INFO:
PART 1: General questions
1. Briefly describe the case study, e.g., "disruption of the music industry by online
distribution."
2. Who are the Incumbent and Entrant firms?
a. Incumbent firms:
b. Entrant firms
3. Describe the Incumbent's and Entrant's product/service
a. Incumbent product/service:
b. Entrant product/service:
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4. What constitutes Quality and Innovation of the product/service in this case?
Quality refers to the basicfeatures perfected by Incumbent technology. Innovation refers
to new features based on new technology. For example, in the case of PSTN vs. VoIP,
Quality constitutes voice quality and reliability, whereas Innovation constitutes voice,
video, and data convergence.
a. Describe the basic features of the product/service:
b. Describe the innovative features of the product/service:
5. What is a reasonable starting point for this case?
When did the potentially disruptive product/service enter the market? This could be the
specific date of a product release or official announcement, a particular quarter when
sales reached a certain point, or even a decade.
6. What was the outcome of this case?
Can you conclusively say whether the Incumbent won, lost, or shares the market with the
Entrant? If you think that an Incumbent company lost but there is still a chance it can
come back again, or a new cycle has begun where former Entrants are now the
Incumbents, this case is considered as over, and the process of return or the new cycle is
the next case.
Please describe what happened if the case is over (Incumbent was disrupted and left the
market, Entrant failed to enter the market, Incumbent and Entrant share the market). If
the case is ongoing, please describe what you think might happen.
* Incumbents won:
* Incumbents lost:
* Incumbents shared market with Entrants:
* Ongoing (Please provide the description of the outcome):
If you want to stop here, please email the survey back to SERGEY snaumov sloan.mit.edu
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PART 2: Detailed questions
incumbent: product/service questions
7. What has happened to the Incumbent product/service's PRICE from the beginning of
the case until the end (or until now)?
Please attempt to quantify if possible.
8. What has happened to the Incumbent product/service's QUALITY from the
beginning of the case till the end (or till now)?
Please describe how the quality has changed.
9. What has happened to the Incumbent product/service's INNOVATION from the
beginning of the case till the end (or till now)?
Please describe how the innovation has changed.
10. Are there direct network effects for the Incumbent's product/service?
Direct network effects exist when the utility of the product depends on the size of the
user base, i.e., its value increases with its use by other consumers.
11. Are there indirect network effect (platform features) of the Incumbent's
product/service?
Indirect effect is the degree at which the utility of the product depends on the size of the
user base of complementary products. When other firms can use a technology's features,
the technology functions as a platform, thus strengthening the indirect network effect.
Multiple firms are working on the same platform help to promote market share.
12. What constitutes switching costs for the Incumbent's product/service?
Switching costs may be due to unique features of the product or contractual obligations.
13. What has happened to the network effect of the Incumbent's product over time?
14. What has happened to the switching costs of the Incumbent's product over time?
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Incumbent: Firm Questions
15. What has happened to the Incumbent's market share?
Possible answers include increased, decreased, reduced substantially, exit the market,
market dominance etc.
16. What happened to the market share of technology? (e.g., of PSTN vs. VoIP)
17. What happened to the market share of firms?
18. What do you believe were the important resources for the Incumbent?
I.e. technologies, patents, manufacturing base, supply chain, sales and marketing etc.
19. Did the Incumbent produce the whole product or rely upon a third party?
Please describe what fraction of the product was produced in-house vs. outsourced. For
example, fully vertically integrated company is making 100% in-house, while fully
horizontal is making 10% in-house and outsources the rest.
Entrant: product/service questions
20. What has happened to the Entrant product/service's PRICE from the beginning of
the case until the end (or until now)?
Please attempt to quantify if possible.
21. What has happened to the Entrant product/service's QUALITY from the beginning of
the case till the end (or till now)?
Please describe how the quality has changed.
22. What has happened to the Entrant product/service's INNNOVATION from the
beginning of the case till the end (or till now)?
Please describe how the innovation has changed.
23. Are there direct network effects for the Entrant's product/service?
Direct network effect exists when the utility of the product for a consumer increases with
its use by other consumers.
24. Are there indirect network effect (platform features) of the Entrant's
product/service?
Indirect effect is the degree at which the utility of the product depends on the size of the
user base of complementary products. A platform results when a technology has a set of
features or functions that can be used by other firms thus creating stronger (indirect)
network effect. Multiple firms are working on the same platform help to promote market
share.
25. What constitutes switching costs for the Entrant's product/service?
Switching costs may be due to unique features of the product or contractual obligations.
26. What has happened to the network effect of Entrant's product over time?
27. What has happened to the switching costs of Entrant's product over time?
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Entrant: Firm Questions
28. What has happened to the Entrants' market share?
Possible answers include increased, exit the market, market dominance etc.
29. What happened to the market share of technology? (e.g., of PSTN vs. VoIP)
30. What happened to the market share of firms?
31. What do you believe were the important resources for the Entrant?
I.e. technologies, patents, manufacturing base, supply chain, sales and marketing etc.
32. Did the Entrant produce the whole product or rely upon a third party?
Please describe to the extent possible what fraction of the product was produced in-
house vs. outsourced. For example, fully vertically integrated company is making 100%
in-house, while fully horizontal is making 10% in-house and outsources the rest.
Please email the survey back to SERGEY snaumovCasloan.mit.edu
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Environment questions
Sensitivity means how important for the users is the price and quality level of the
product. How important is the level of innovation, offered by the product? In other
words, how much do users want the innovation? It is degree at which customers care
about network effect (will they want to use its benefits?).
Please describe below the nature of sensitivity to given feature, and why you believe it
was so.
33. Price
34. Quality
35. Innovation
36. Network Effect
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